Among students of the so-called "Young Hegelians," it is usual to name David F. Strauss (1808–1874) as the first to develop Hegelianism after Hegel.1 He did not, however, see his role as anything more than being a disciple of what he understood to be orthodox Hegelianism. In merely applying what he conscientiously took to be the authentic principles of the master to a hitherto unexamined field, i.e., biblical criticism, Strauss joined himself to the older school of orthodox and conservative Hegelians. These "Epigonen" were not displeased to consider themselves as but the satraps of a vanished philosophical Alexander who had been left with only the uncreative task of dividing and cultivating an already conquered Geisterreich.2 In short, Strauss was not the first critic of Hegel, but merely the first Hegelian critic. The honor, if that is the correct term, of being the first Hegelian to criticize Hegel and thereby to create a "neo-Hegelianism" belongs to August von Cieszkowski (1814–1894).

This paper has two main intentions: first, to determine the nature of Cieszkowski’s radical critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history, along with the reasons Cieszkowski employed to justify his critique, and second, to submit a possible objection that Hegel might have taken in regard to the corrective surgery that Cieszkowski performed upon the corpus of his philosophy.

1 There were indeed a number of critical studies directed against Hegel’s philosophy well before Strauss’s work appeared as well as a number of sympathetic studies (e.g., Gösche’s Aphorismen of 1829), but whereas the former took a stance against Hegel and the latter more or less repeated Hegel, Strauss was the first to attempt to apply Hegelianism, and in this sense he can be properly said to have “developed” it.

Cieszkowski was the heir of a wealthy and Aristocratic Polish family, who would in time receive the title of Count. In 1830, as a consequence of his involvement in the Polish insurrection and the subsequent Russian occupation, he was compelled to leave Warsaw. In the following year, he attended the University of Krakow, where he studied some philosophy, but it seems he was not introduced to Hegelianism until he entered the University of Berlin in 1832. There, within the course of five semesters of study, he became acquainted with some of the most devoted and liberal of the Berlin Hegelians such as Eduard Gans, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich G. Hotho, and Johann E. Erdmann. Among these younger academics, many of whom were then but untenured Privatdozenten, was Karl F. Werder, who was probably the main personal link between Cieszkowski and young Karl Marx. But of all of his new acquaintances, none became a closer friend to Cieszkowski than one of his teachers, the lecturer Carl F. Michelet (1801–1893). Michelet exercised a powerful and encouraging influence upon his new student and friend, not only planning for the publication of Cieszkowski’s projected critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history, but finding in that critique an echo of his own views on the matter of the future of philosophy.

In Berlin in 1833 to study philosophy meant to study Hegel, for then, as Rudolf Haym recalled, “One was either a Hegelian or a barbarian, idiot, laggard and hateful empiricist.” But within two years of Cieszkowski’s arrival, in 1835, Strauss’ heretical Leben Jesu was published. To the dismay of the Hegelian academics enjoying official sanction, Strauss declared himself to be a true follower of Hegel. Their subsequent failure to produce a definitive Hegelian refutation of Strauss was sufficient justification for an ideological coup d’état by the many orthodox Lutheran clerics who had gathered about the throne of the aging King Friedrich Wilhelm III. With both conservative

---


3 See above, note 3. Kühne also appends an exchange of letters between Cieszkowski and Michelet that extends from 1836 to 1893.

6 It would seem that Cieszkowski was not only introduced to the term “praxis” by Michelet, but also to its new meaning within the post-Hegelian world. Even before the death of Hegel, in May of 1831, Michelet had already seen beyond the twilight of philosophy, that “gray on gray” in which the Owl of Minerva took flight, and already was anticipating that “Die Eule der Minerva weicht dann aber auch wieder dem Hahnenschlage eines neu anbrechenden Tages.” Jahrh. für wiss. Kritik (Nr. 88): 607. Cieszkowski employs almost the exact metaphor in his 1844 Gott und Palingenesie (21). See Horst Stuke’s Philosophie der Tat: Studien zur Verwirklichung der Philosophie bei den Junghegelianern und den wahren Sozialisten (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1993), 64.

clerics and reactionary politicians in virtual control of the state system of
education, and deprived of the power and diplomacy of Hegel, the younger
disciples of Hegel were to experience greater and greater difficulty in ob-
taining academic appointments. By the early 1840s, a number of these
young Hegelians were transformed into the radical critics of a society which,
under the general suasion of Metternich’s conservatism and the more reac-
tionary Prussian regime of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, seemed deserving of their
scorn and revolutionary programs. In short, the young followers of Hegel
were to become something of a radical party of social and political critics, the
“Young” or “Left” Hegelians, some of whom proudly declared themselves to
be the “Free Ones [die Freien],” and whose wish to rationalize the real found
its principle in various forms of atheistic humanism, from Feuerbach’s sen-
sualism to Stirner’s Egoism. The numerous writings of this new class of
intellectuals took the decidedly unacademic form of what Karl Löwith chas-
tised as but “manifestos, programs, and theses.” All these bits and pieces of
this lost generation of Hegelians have been virtually lost and forgotten to the
public with the exception of The Communist Manifesto. This document alone,
with its call for the practical application of theory, remains as a vestige of
Cieszkowski’s program for the future. His program, published in 1838, just
one decade before The Communist Manifesto, bore the imposing title Prolego-
mena zur Historiosophie [Prolegomena to the Wisdom of History]. It now
seems a rather ambitious project to be handled in 150 pages. Nevertheless,

---

8 Even before 1840-41 the younger Hegelians had difficulties in obtaining academic posts. Karl Werder, for example, was unable to advance beyond the position of lecturer (which he became in 1838) “da der Hegelianismus an massgebender Stelle keine Förderung mehr erfuhr.” See Kühne, 24. D. F. Strauss was removed from his teaching post in 1835, even before the second volume of Leben Jesu appeared. The cultural minister Altenstein sent Bruno Bauer from Berlin to Bonn in 1839 in order to appease the clerical pressures of such as Hengstenberg. Arnold Ruge had been told by Altenstein in 1838 that the Hallische Jahrbücher was in danger of being suppressed. Under suspicion of the conservative Erlangen faculty, Ludwig Feuerbach could not obtain a teaching post at Erlangen after three applications, and gave up his hopes for an academic career in 1837. For these and others, Cieszkowski’s work came at a time when only the hope of a better future could make their present situation acceptable, but the future, when it arrived in 1840 in the form of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, proved even more refractory to Hegelian theory. Cieszkowski’s evolutionary praxis became, through Hess’s “Philosophy of the Deed,” Marx’s “critical-revolutionary praxis.”


11 (Berlin: Veit, 1838; reprinted: Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981). An edited translation of part of this work is to be found in André Liebich’s Selected Writings of August Cieszkowski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); additional translated material from the Prolegomena is also found in my The Young Hegelians: An Anthology (Cambridge: University Press, 1983).
as Nicholas Lobkowicz has stated, the "small book" is, "at least as far as the notion of praxis is concerned, . . . the most brilliant and the most important single text published between Hegel's death in 1831 and the Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts [1844] of Marx."18 The work could hardly have come as a surprise to the Berlin Hegelians, for Cieszkowski had outlined his project years earlier to Michelet, and Karl Werder had lectured for a full semester on the Prolegomena from the galley proofs of the work—a half-year before its publication.19

It was in this, his first work, that the term and a new meaning of praxis was introduced into post-Hegelian dialogue. A lexical study of the writings of Hegel reveals no evidence of the term having any importance—the term appears not even to have been used by Hegel. In point of fact, it appears not to have been used at all in the major works of any of the post-Kantian philosophers, including Kant himself. In all probability, Cieszkowski had first heard the term used by Michelet, who had written and lectured upon Aristotle's Ethics,14 in which the term πρᾶξις makes an early appearance in philosophic literature.15 In any case, the term took on revolutionary connotations within the context of post-Hegelian thought, and served as a satisfying verbal bridge between the theories of Hegel and the world-transforming intentions of the Young Hegelians, particularly Karl Marx. As one commentator has noted, "By 1843, Cieszkowski's central idea—to transcend philosophy through social praxis—was the standard fare of the entire Hegelian left."16 In this new vision, the contradictions that exist between theory and practice have been resolved, with impractical theory and unthinking practice fused into either practical theory or theoretical practice—to praxis. Marx's seminal eleven "Theses on Feuerbach" were written only a few years after Cieszkowski's critique of Hegel, and the evidences of that critique are apparent. Marx's "Eighth Thesis" most clearly displays the sign of Cieszkowski's view on the relation now holding between philosophical the-

14 See Kühnne, 379–80, for Michelet's work on Aristotle.
15 On the meaning of "praxis" in ancient thought and its connotations among the "Left" Hegelians, see Lobkowicz's Theory and Practice, note 12 above.
16 Liebich, Selected Writings of August Cieszkowski, 11. This is an excellent source for references regarding the influence exerted by Cieszkowski upon his contemporaries. It more fully documents a contention of this paper that Cieszkowski exercised a fundamental and far-reaching effect upon post-Hegelian political and social viewpoints. Stuke's work is also of great value in this regard.
ory and social practice: "All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and in the comprehension of this praxis."\textsuperscript{17} This thesis is absolutely central to Marxism, and both the term and the basic modern conception of the term "praxis" is taken from Cieszkowski. It is true, however, that Marx also added to this new conception by introducing the notion of a "critical" praxis, which added a revolutionary dimension to the concept. With Cieszkowski, praxis entailed a "conservative progress" as he held to an "evolutionary, as opposed to a revolutionary, development" of Hegelianism.\textsuperscript{18} In short, praxis was not, for Cieszkowski, a revolutionary act but a new way of approaching social reality. But his caution was lost in the face of a growing disenchantment among the liberal Hegelians with the idea of gradual social progress, of a social reform peacefully and lawfully initiated.\textsuperscript{19} It was this impatience which led Moses Hess, who must have played a role in acquainting the young Marx with Cieszkowski,\textsuperscript{20} to replace the notion of a philosophy of "Praxis" with that of a more radical philosophy of "the Deed [der Tat]." But in any case, there are grounds for arguing that the Marxian conception of "praxis" finds its principle source in Cieszkowski's reading of Hegel, and that this reading afforded a model of how philosophy could play a direct role in the formation of a reasonable future.

The future had not concerned Hegel. Indeed, he had once mentioned, in passing, that it did belong to a distant North America. But even within the same passage in which North America is characterized as "the country of the future" Hegel felt immediately constrained to introduce a cautionary note: "Prophecy is not the business of the philosopher. In history we are concerned not with what belongs exclusively to the past or to the future, but with that which is, both now and eternally—in short, with reason. And that is quite enough to occupy our attention."\textsuperscript{21} It was not enough, however, to occupy the attention of the Young Hegelians, particularly Cieszkowski.

\textsuperscript{17} Karl Marx, \textit{Die Frühscriften} (Stuttgart: Kroner, 1964). 339.
\textsuperscript{18} See Kühne, 218.
\textsuperscript{20} For the relationship between Hess and Cieszkowski, see author's "Between the Twilight of Theory and the Millenial Dawn: August von Cieszkowski and Moses Hess" in \textit{Hegel's Philosophy of Action}, ed. L. S. Stepelevich and D. Lamb. (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983), 213–26. Hess's praise of Cieszkowski appears, e.g., in his \textit{Die europäische Triarchie} (Leipzig, 1841) where he speaks of the "geistvöllle Cieszkowski" (5) and agrees with the ideas of the Prolegomena.
Hegel's disregard of the future rested upon a principle that infuses the whole of his thought. Philosophy is, as in Fichte and Schelling, a theoretical or retrospective activity, a description of, rather than a prescription for, the movement of the Absolute. There are indeed grounds for maintaining (as Friedrich Engels does)\textsuperscript{44} that Hegelian dialectic is implicitly revolutionary, but "right wing" Hegelians have also found reasons to see the system as counter-revolutionary.\textsuperscript{43} Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, which occupy most of Cieszkowski's critical attention, are, as most of Hegel's works, open to interpretation. But Cieskowski was intent upon something more than merely interpreting Hegel; he set about recasting the whole of his structure into a new form which could serve as a theoretical instrument for social change.

Hegel's philosophy of history is in essence a description of the progress made so far by the idea in its search for self-realization and freedom. This progress of the idea follows the dialectical model of "universal—particular—individual," a triadic development appropriate to "the principle of freedom."\textsuperscript{44} The first appearance of the World Spirit, which is the form the Idea takes when it enters into Nature and renders it into conscious history, is in the Orient. In this period, human consciousness is dominated by the simple thought of universality. As the Spirit moves West, the consciousness of the particular emerges first among the Greeks and then the Romans, where submission of the particular to law prepares the Spirit for its final stage, that of the German-Christian World.\textsuperscript{45} The dialectical stages are evident in the famous passages concerning the growing consciousness of freedom: "These general remarks [in the Introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of history] on the different degrees of knowledge of freedom—firstly that of the Orientals, who knew only that One is free, then that of the Greek and Roman world, which knew that Some are free, and finally, our own knowledge that All men as such are free, and that man is by nature free—supply us with the divisions we shall observe in our survey of world history."\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} See F. Engels's Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy in which the whole of the Hegelian method is reduced to the principle "All that exists deserves to perish."

\textsuperscript{43} For this viewpoint see Hermann Lübbecke's Politische Philosophie in Deutschland (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1963), or the more extreme work of Hubert Kiesewetter, Von Hegel zu Hitler (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974).

\textsuperscript{44} For the connection of the universal—particular—individual triad to the "principle of freedom" see Hegel's Encyclopädia, Logic, paragraphs 160–63.

\textsuperscript{45} "Die germanische Welt" is not simply congruent to the German nation (which did not exist in Hegel's day) but to Western Europe as a whole.

In the first few pages of the Prolegomena, and quite properly before presenting his own views as to what might comprise a perfected Hegelian philosophy of history, Cieszkowski exposed what he considered to be a crucial error in Hegel's conception of the course of history. Whether generated out of an inexplicable and unusual lack of consistency on Hegel's part, or out of some moral inhibition, the introduction of this singular flaw had put an end to the speculative consideration of the future, leaving all reflection upon the future at the mercy of unguided speculation. The discovery of this error, and the insight into its persistent and fearful vitiation of Hegelianism afforded both the occasion and justification of Cieszkowski's well-meaning correction. Hegel's error is found in his four-fold division of world history: the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the German. This did not correspond to the triadic form required of the development of Spirit, but to the quadratic development of nature, so, since history was the development of Spirit, Hegel had erred.

The four-fold division of history is set forth not only in Gans' 1837 edition of Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of History, but also in the Philosophy of Right, both of which were readily available to Cieszkowski.

It is certainly the case that, according to Hegel, nature is the realm where a quadratic dialectic holds sway. The following quotation, taken from Hegel's Naturphilosophie touches directly upon and supports the point of Cieszkowski's critique:

In nature, taken as otherness, the square or tetrad also belongs to the whole form of necessity, as in the four elements, the four colors, etc. . . . The totality of the disjunction of the Notion exists in nature as a tetrad, the first of which is universality as such [the Oriental World?]. The second term is difference, and appears in nature as a duality [the Greek and Roman World?], for in nature the other must exist for itself as an otherness. Consequently, the subjective unity of universality and particularity is the fourth term, which has a further existence as against the other three [the Germanic world?].

If the point would be conceded that Hegel has indeed used the quadratic "form of necessity" to apply to the course of world history, then only Cieszkowski's minor premise would remain to be proven, that world history is the expression of spirit. On this matter Hegel is unequivocal:

World history belongs to the realm of the spirit. The world as a whole comprehends both physical and spiritual nature. Physical nature also plays a part in world history, and we shall certainly include some initial remarks on the basic outlines of the natural influence. But the spirit and the course of its development are the true

---

substance of history. We do not have to consider nature here as a rational system in
its own right—although it is indeed a rational system, operating in its own distinct
element—but only in relation to spirit.³⁸

But if, as Hegel asserts, "in spirit the fundamental form of necessity is the
triad," and "world history falls within the realm of spirit," then he should
not use the quadratic form of necessity to govern history. Either history is
the expression of spirit, in which case it is expressed in the formal mode
proper to spirit, which is the triad, or history is the expression of nature, and
expressed in a non-triadic form. But history is not the expression of nature
but of spirit, and therefore should be set within a triadic schema. Any Hegel-
ian, if determined to be not only a Hegelian but also to be consistent with
the major premises of the master, must correct Hegel. This is Cieszkowski's
argument, and explains why he believed himself to be a better Hegelian than
Hegel—at least in regard to establishing the forms of world-history.

It is not to the present purpose of this paper to detail the features of
Cieszkowski's revision which, by replacing Hegel's tetradic order with a
"speculative tricotomy," would provide "the cognition of the essence of the
future through speculation."³⁹ Here, it is enough merely to note that the
triadic form of history that suited Cieszkowski, and so many of the Young
Hegelians, was the division of history into past, present, and future. The
past world, from the beginning of history to the Christian era, was domi-
nated by practical concerns; the present, which reached fruition in Hegelian
philosophy, was an era of theory; and an era of "post-theoretical praxis
which properly belongs to the future."⁴⁰ In the new age a higher conscious-
ness will emerge, in which "mankind apprehends itself concretely and vitally
to become an organic humanity which can certainly be called a church in the
highest sense."⁴¹

Cieszkowski immediately anticipates the objection that his employment
of the triad to explicate the moments of history is but a formal exercise in
"pedantic schematism" by noting that "either the laws of dialectics are uni-
versal and inviolable and should thus find their real manifestation in history;
or else they are weak, partial and inadequate, in which case they should not
be proclaimed in other spheres of knowledge and their deduction must
everywhere be deprived of all necessity."⁴²

³⁸ Philosophy of World History, 44. The paragraph also contains a marginal note: "spirit
higher than nature." Ibid., 230.
³⁹ Prolegomena, 8; Liebich, 51.
⁴⁰ Prolegomena, 18; Liebich, 55.
⁴¹ Prolegomena, 153; Liebich, 81.
⁴² Prolegomena, 5–6; Liebich, 51.
Now, is it possible to answer this influential criticism of Hegel's philosophy of history? If not, then we must agree with André Liebich, who, in his extensive study of Cieszkowski, asserts that "In purely formal terms Hegel is inconsistent. He distinguishes four eras in history. Such a tetrachotomous division is inappropriate to nature where the second moment bifurcates. It is inappropriate to the highest process of spirit which is distinct from the externality of nature."³³

I believe that Cieszkowski's argument can be, if not rebutted, at least weakened, by a careful reading of Hegel, a reading which evidently was not made by Cieszkowski nor those who accepted his argumentation, such as Bakunin and Alexander Herzen.³⁴

The critique of Cieszkowski's critique naturally begins with the re-examination of just what Hegel did say in justification of his fourfold division of the course of world history. The justification that Cieszkowski would have had before him—although no references are given—and the only full justification that Hegel himself expressed, is found in the Philosophy of Right. There are but two paragraphs directed to explaining why history is divided into four periods.³⁵ The first paragraph is neither clear nor convincing:

The concrete Ideas, the minds of nations, have their truth and their destiny in the concrete Idea which is absolute universality, i.e., in the world mind. Around its throne they stand as the executors of its actualization and as signs and ornaments of its grandeur. As mind, it is nothing but its active movement towards absolute knowledge of itself and therefore towards freeing its consciousness from the form of natural immediacy and so coming to itself. Therefore the principles of the formations of this self-consciousness in the course of its liberation—the world historical realms—are four in number.

The declarations leading up to this deceptive "therefore," which asserts that four principles—set as the Archangels about the Throne of God—are simply that, declarations. I find no reason here given to divide the course of world-history into four "world-historical realms" and neither did Cieszkowski. The second following paragraph is more philosophically explicit, but still misleading:

In its first and immediate revelation, mind has as its principle the shape of the substantial mind, i.e. the shape of the identity in which individuality is absorbed in its essence and its claims are not explicitly recognized.

³⁴ Ibid., 6ff.
The second principle is this substantial mind endowed with knowledge so that mind is both the positive content and filling of mind and also the individual self-awareness which is the living form of mind. This principle is ethical individuality as beauty.

The third principle is the inward deepening of this individual self-awareness and knowledge until it reaches abstract universality and therefore infinite opposition to the objective world which in the same process has become mind-forsaken.

The principle of the fourth formation is the conversion of this opposition so that mind receives in its inner life its truth and concrete essence, while in objectivity it is at home and reconciled with itself. The mind which has thus reverted to the substantiality with which it began is the mind which has returned out of the infinite opposition, and which consequently engenders and knows this its truth as thought and as a world of actual laws.

Hegel sums up the whole matter in a brief concluding paragraph: "In accordance with these four principles, the world-historical realms are the following: (1) the Oriental, (2) the Greek, (3) the Roman, (4) the Germanic."

I would submit that, contrary to Cieszkowski, this four-fold division established by Hegel is in fact based upon the triadic form of necessity appropriate to spirit, which history expresses.

The quadratic or tetradic form appropriate to nature is one in which the second member, the antithetical moment, is radically divided in itself. Such a division would generate four dialectically distinctive moments, each being set in contradictory opposition one to another, or in what might be termed qualitative opposition.

A careful comparison of this explication of the tetradic form found in nature to the passage in which Hegel nominates four realms of world history reveals that the tetradic form of necessity which governs the development of nature is not simply congruent with Hegel's four-fold division of history.

The tetradic form appropriate to nature, the "Idea in the form of Otherness," are abstractly expressed as full qualitative differences, its radical Aussersichsein finding expression in the contradictory exfoliation of its antithetical moment, which "appears in nature as a duality." There is, in nature, just because it is the negation of the intentionality of Logic, no generic character. Natural forms are set forth in space, or externally generated, and have no ideal unity or generic note—they are simply "other," not only to subjectivity but to themselves. In Hegel's words, "Nature is not merely external in relation to this idea (and to its subjective existence Spirit); the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as

---

57 Ibid., par. 254: "Die erste oder unmittelbare Bestimmung der Natur ist die abstrakte Allgemeinheit ihres Aussersichseins."
Nature, exists."\textsuperscript{38} History, on the other hand, as an expression of Spirit, is, even in its dualities, characterized by contrary oppositions, and develops within the extremes of a genus. In short, quantitative change precedes qualitative change, or only contrary elements find contradictory opposition, just as the contraries of the Greek and Roman realms find contradiction in either the Oriental or the Germanic, but not in themselves. The Roman and Greek realms share a radical generic characteristic: they are both found within that historical era dominated by the general principle of "individual self-awareness and knowledge." The Roman world is characterized by only "the inward deepening [\textit{das in sich Vertiefen}] of this individual self-awareness and knowledge," and although the Roman age ultimately leads to the total "conversion of this opposition," and so to the Germanic realm, it is itself not the product of any "conversion" from the Greek period. The Greek realm was dialectically generated out of the contradiction of the substantial mind of the Orient, and thus the emergent Greek world was qualitatively opposed to the Oriental world, whose "mind has as its principle the shape of substantial mind." The Greek world as its principle "this substantial mind [of the Orient] endowed with knowledge." The Greek world is that of "the mind which differentiates itself to individual mentality" and the Roman world \textit{merely continues} this process as the realm in which this "differentiation is carried to its conclusion [\textit{vollbringt sich die Unterscheidung}]." The Roman world brings about the logical exhaustion of this principle of differentiation until left with only the "infinite grief" of the "infinite extremes of private self-consciousness of persons on the one hand and abstract universality on the other." This is the moment of quantitative development now poised for a \textit{qualitative} leap into the Germanic realm. There are but \textit{two} qualitative turns in Hegel's division of world history, that between the Orientals and the Greeks and that between the Romans and the Germanic, there is \textit{none} between the Greeks and the Romans.

History, according to Hegel, does develop in a triadic form, and all of the many "manifestos, programs, and theses" which have found root in Cieszkowski's critique of Hegel are grounded in a misreading of Hegel. As Walter Kaufmann observed, "The basic structure of Hegel's philosophy of history furnishes another striking corroboration of our reinterpretation: nobody could possibly construe it in terms of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, although there are, as usual, three stages."\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Villanova University}

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., par. 247.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary} (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 254.