

FROM DARWIN TO NIETZSCHE

A Book of Evolutionary Ethics

BY

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Translated by Eugene Günther, 2021

Translator's preface:

This is not a professional translation. Its an amateurish one, heavily aided by machine translation. Most of the footnotes are from Tille and those with brackets are mine. Being as it is, it is not advised to be used as a serious citation, but I do hope it helps one grasp Tille's book.

To my dear parents.

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FOREWORD

With this book I take the risk of historically portraying the main outlines of a spiritual movement of the present that has not yet come to an end. The attempt at this historical drawing does not lead to the immediate present, but only to Friedrich Nietzsche. A few significant rallies that not only fall in terms of time but also of content beyond Nietzsche have been intentionally excluded. With Nietzsche's ethics, as it appears in "Thus spoke Zarathustra", evolutionary ethics seems to me to have reached the first milestone of its development. With this book by Nietzsche, the great guiding principle of Darwin's development theory is for the first time pure and unclouded by prevailing moral ideas applied to humanity today and to the future development of mankind. As soon as this application is found, evolutionary ethics, like Darwinian social science, step out of the time of groping and start to work on individual science. For it is still important to apply the two principles of social selection and social elimination to all areas of moral life and to the existence of the people to transform the ethical and social theories in all their details. The economist, the doctor, the teacher, the legislator, they all have to work here, and it will show that there are still some moral and social dogmas of today and that both the theoretical and the practical side of the two sciences have to go to court Doctrine before a developed Darwinian social ethic is created, the institutions of which are the expression of the natural relationships between people and which bears fruit as the practical economic art of the people and even more rarely someone continues them in a straight line. So it does not represent itself as a continuous chain, but as a series of parallel stretches, among which, however, the ones that are added later become longer and longer, while the first are the shortest. This has the quick happy solution to the problem: what are the immediate consequences of development theory for practical ethics? unfortunately even more difficult than the historical presentation of the attempts at this solution. Only Germans and Englishmen share the cultivation of this field.

The French only participated in scientific statistics, which will one day become important for Darwinian social ethics. But to include Alphonse de Candolle and Georges de Lapouge in the circle of my considerations seemed to me to be as little advisable as to include

Francis Galton, Albert Schaffte or Otto Ammon in detail. The link between their achievements and evolutionary ethics only falls beyond Nietzsche. Darwinian social science, however, is an independent field that must have been touched here and there, but from which even the most essential literature could not be cited. Despite his close contact with evolutionary ethics, his subject is so different that a reasonably appropriate representation of this trend would fill a volume like this.

If I am to express my thanks for the support that I have received in this book, it is shared between a German and an Englishman. The knowledge I owe to Ernst Hackel's works is written on every page of my book. And that, like any future worker in the field of evolutionary ethics, I am grateful to use numerous references to an excellent collection of materials for the field of developmental ethics, CM Williams' "Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution" made that is expressly stated here. The fact that the factual field of my book and that of Williams' only coincide to one third may be proof of the importance and extent that evolutionary ethics in Germany and evolutionary ethics in Great Britain have already gained; At the same time, however, it is also evidence of the extent to which the worker has to keep critical selection here. The reason that I have essentially limited myself to considering moral goals, ideals and norms is not only because this practical part of ethics has been neglected by modern science, with the exception of Nietzsche, but above all because it has the most far-reaching meaning for the further development of moral conceptions of the present. The fact that I took a different path from the treatment of the item than Williams may justify itself.

Even where criticism of other people's opinions has become the means for me to independently develop a point here and there, I have kept to the limits that I had set myself, over there Darwin and over here Nietzsche.

This book brings my parents a warm spring greeting to the quiet, flower-filled rectory in the Saxon Mulden highlands.

Glasgow, March 30, 1895.

Dr. Alexander Tille

FROM DARWIN TO NIETZSCHE

Evolutionary Theory and Evolutionary Ethics

Until the seventeenth century, the general worldview was purely mythological, and it still is in many parts of the world, including among the cultural peoples. The mythological world view is a standstill view. Once formed by gods or by a god, the earth, like the universe, has a fixed form, all living beings, plants and animals, are given fixed norms, types from which the individual can move away every now and then by a minimal bit, who can never change themselves. There is no progress under its own steam; at the most an impetus from the outside could raise the type to a higher level, of course with one stroke, through an “act of creation“. Although man, in a comical manner, sets himself to the purpose and center of the universe and his earth the proud middle position in it instructs, even though he turns all the thinking and doing of his deities around human welfare and contraction, he nevertheless feels dependent on the hypostasised personal violence outside, above him, and raises his bold speculations about his coming and going on earth to revelations of his deities. Since Plato, he has been thinking of a world of ideas that will one day melt out of earthly existence. Christianity builds this mythological idea and bases it on its entire daring edifice of imagination. Since man does not know his natural origin, he spins a mythological one, and with it there is at the same time a mythological end, a mythological goal of being single as well as being of the species. That is the framework of his worldview.

With the awakening of individual intellectual life in the sixteenth century, which is clearly reflected in the subjective certainty of belief, natural science begins to emerge. In the sixteenth century, Köpernick and Kepler discovered the position of the earth in the solar system and the laws of planetary movement, in the seventeenth Newton the law of gravity and the wave theory of light, Harvey the blood circulation in humans, and in the course of the following two centuries, building block was added to building block, the Kant-Laplace’s world development theory solved numerous puzzles until, in 1859, Darwin finally gave the huge building a firm style with his evolutionary theory, which would hardly be able to move any more. Since then, science has given us the answer to all the big questions about the formation of our planetary system, the earth, life on it, the

kinship and development history of living beings, humans, the position of humans in nature and the probable future of our star. Not all the details of this giant building of knowledge are yet clearly before our eyes, but the outlines are irrevocably clear. Instead of the mythological arbitrariness, the natural causality, instead of the standstill of eternal change, instead of the abolition of eternal norm the inexorable progress has taken place, instead of the dualism the monism, instead of the peace and harmony the tireless struggle, instead of the wise providence the adaptation to the Conditions of existence, instead of the divine origin of humanity the animal, instead of the center in the world system a humble planet that draws its ellipse around the sun. Darwin's evolutionary theory has brought about most of these changes.

For those who are familiar with the intellectual movements within the sciences of today and especially within those who are in any way related to the organic natural sciences, it can no longer be a question today that evolutionary science will hold up far more than even the boldest heads of the first rush of enthusiasm promised after it had cleared Darwin's head in days of clarity. A number of sciences are already busy transforming themselves completely; others show the first characteristics. In the general worldview it is likely to cause the most violent change that has ever taken place. Such things do not happen overnight. Above all, the thinkers must first come who think the individual thoughts ahead of the educated, and these do not come overnight. Probably from the whole - apart from a few leading spirits such as Darwin, Wallace, Huxley, Hackel, Weismann - only the ones from the young generation who have grown up with evolutionary science are able to draw more conclusions for the general worldview from it. Here, too, mistakes in direction and intensity will not fail to materialize; but the end result will be a safe and consistent one.

Human life is also part of natural life; Human views on the life of man and his position towards his fellow men must also be subject to that change, and this all the more because everything that has been thought about them up to the present day is more one-sided demands of man on himself than on observation arose from a given fact.

For twenty-two centuries Buddhism, eighteen centuries Christianity, three centuries reciprocal Roman law and for a century Rousseau have preached the belief that all people are equal. Buddhism and Christianity have added the warning that all people love each other

and should sacrifice themselves for each other. That was a lesson, and it remained a lesson. People preached this on Sundays, on weekdays they wrestled with each other in wild competition for the means of life and contested every bite of bread. And since the week contains six working days and only one Sunday, the apprenticeship has made very slow progress. This teaching is by no means a summary of the facts of life, but one. Claim and admonition that hits these facts in the face. Although over the centuries it has now been the facts, i. e. the formation of the social order, which has only negligibly influenced it, has pushed it out of consciousness, and so completely that Darwin had to rediscover the competition for existence through means, also called the struggle for existence, for a second time, although most people fight him all their lives. On the other hand, that preaching has succeeded in making people really believe that equality, love and peace are the core points of life; they have become the ideas you looked for, where you believed, where you swore. They have been regarded as the eternally human gospel, as the highest and most sacred good of humanity, and have become the all-dominant life theory. The social ideal or future goal of the future that Thomas More had been thinking of Western European thinkers then arose from them, and the realization that it includes a utopia in the modern sense of the word is only of very recent origin. Hegel has given the image of happy, peaceful, loving humanity a new support: - All conflicting interests are balanced, everyone works for the other. There is mutual love and sacrifice. The general sense of justice does not tolerate inequality; Hardship, misery, hunger and war have stopped. Peace and harmony have become the permanent foundations of general happiness. This ideal is firmly established. It is the only true human ideal, and if the theory of development is truth, then it must be offered the strongest support imaginable.

Will it be offered? Will that be possible?

Natural research, or generally the monistic worldview, willingly answered all questions about what is from the beginning, so gladly it was guilty of not answering the other question from the beginning: what should we do? how do we have to act to do right? or what is morally good for us and what is morally bad? what does our moral ideal have to be? No worldview is complete without a concise answer to these questions. Not, as Kant said and after him Wundt, that ethics was an independent area that could influence our views about what

is objective nature of space or help determine our view of it, but in the sense that the norms for human action must be in line with the theoretical conviction, that they have to be reformed if this line is lacking, that the theoretical conviction must in all cases be the judge of the ethical ideal and through this the judge of the ethical feeling.

Only by means of a strange coincidence could the moral ideals that can be derived from the theory of evolution be identical to those of Christianity; for this dualistic doctrine also does not have a feature in common with that monistic theory. Just as peace differs from war, the slave from the free citizen, the sick from the healthy, the weak from the strong, so the old world view differs from that of Darwinism. It is not too much to say that all the statements that this worldview gives us apodictically about nature and the position of man in it, about the stillness of the sun and the formation of the earth by a god, about the formation of man and that Prehistoric social history of mankind in a pleasure garden, about the activity of their God in nature and the physiological - psychological composition of man, about the process of soul and its personal destruction, about the end of the earth and the population of the air sea with spirits of all kinds, that all this information is to be regarded as finally refuted by natural science. Your theoretical side is not the strongest side of the prevailing worldview.

On the other hand, modern natural research arches the giant building it is working on more proudly every year, puts more and more pillars into it every year, and all the thousands of hard-working stonecutters, hawkers, draftsmen, bricklayers and carpenters who work on this structure are satisfied to see the number of those who admire it grow every year. The water that swells in its innermost sanctuary, pure and louder, is already considered to be healthy and particularly powerful for removing clouds of fog. With all the hard work of the building, the end is not yet in sight. Generations will probably chisel and measure, set and straighten, wall and vault on it, probably it will expand as wide as it does and will never be completed.

And should we still see the basis for our moral conduct in the church sold for demolition, from which one bar after the other breaks down, one pillar after the other tends to fall, which has been proven to only come from the wood made of human imagination? This question was raised a long time ago. Their postponement and final answer are among the most important intellectual processes of our day. Its

history, that it overcame, will only be judged to its full extent in the future. Ernst Häckel answers them when he says¹: “I think it is impossible to solve or even promote the ethical question without the religious one; for both are intimately connected; both are rooted in the innermost sanctuary of the thinking man, which he calls his worldview. The great reform of our sensible worldview, which we owe to the advanced knowledge of nature in the last three decades, cannot possibly be without retroactive effect on our moral conviction and on the moral behavior that results from it. Sooner or later, this reformed ethic must necessarily come into fundamental conflicts with the denominational traditions of the different church religions; for the latter are based on mythological poems or alleged revelations; the former, on the contrary, contradicts the sensible knowledge of monistic science.”

This answer seems not only plausible to those who know it, but is self-evident. But a generation ago, it was thought otherwise, and only recently did one deny that this question even existed. The existence of this question had to be proven in heavy fighting. One had to struggle to find a satisfying answer. The answer that emerged from heavy struggles was the final rejection of church ethics.

There was a time when the old school ethicists said that evolutionary theory had nothing to do with ethics and that ethics belonged to a much higher region. Then it was said that there could be a development even in the ethical field, but this had no meaning, because the eternally moral and general human were indestructibly innate as an ideal. Only then did the influence of evolutionary theory on ethics begin.

It is a wonderful phenomenon. How the thinkers of two cultural peoples set to work with great enthusiasm for the fact that they finally, finally, have found a means to firmly base the traditional morality of the present, which can no longer support church faith, on science ; how one takes it for granted that the new great discovery can only support the conventional morality, which is considered to be morality par excellence; how its discoverer himself prefers this, how gradually a more forced interpretation of the cardinal propositions becomes necessary for all organic development; how an eminent philosopher twists everything so that he can apply it to

1 Die Zukunft, No. 7, in an essay “Ethik und Weltanschauung”

what he envisions as the future ethical development of mankind; how another ethicist is reshaping a whole range of old Darwinist ethical precepts, and a naturalist, Darwin's rival, finally applying the law of selection to human society, albeit extremely mild and limited, while others explain that with culture a new factor enters the development of mankind that overrides the laws of nature; how the greatest systematic philosopher of the time carelessly ignores all these germs and only wants to see the further progress of mankind in cultural progress; how the boldest thought bridges are built, arch bridges, suspension bridges, flying bridges; as thinking sees only two points: the fact of evolution, the demands of Christian-democratic ethics; how to think of connecting the two without asking yourself if that is possible at all; as one tries again and again, then limits it to a narrower, ever narrower field, determined not to give it up completely; how the awareness of the impossibility quietly dawned and discouraged the tempting; how slowly, very slowly, the discovery is emerging that evolutionary theory leads to something completely different, and how the thinker who finally finds the new ideal in its sharpness and purity is drunk with his discovery, quite unconsciously that it is now, above all, important to gain norms for life from this new goal of human morality, intoxicated by his new ideal, write a thick book, a book in four parts in which he preaches the glory of the new ideal, again and again, as he delights in the sound of a sentence: "But I am teaching you the superhuman" - all of this is surely one of the most wonderful chapters in the whole human history.

It was not foreseeable whether modern Christian-democratic ethics would easily be compatible with the worldview that natural science had designed. In fact, the various ethical systems that take Darwinism into account initially provide an answer to this question, changing, or rather, slowly changing in the same direction. The decided yes becomes a decided doubt and then a decided no. Darwin said yes, Nietzsche says no.

The piece of modern intellectual history dealing with this problem extends from Darwin to Nietzsche. Although individual building blocks have already been delivered, the time to expand this only begins after Friedrich Nietzsche, which will probably still last a generation, perhaps even the entire twentieth century, or perhaps will never end.

Just as nature in its formations always exhausted all existing possibilities before it created the being that best suited itself to the conditions of existence, so it is also in the intellectual life of mankind. Before an immediate conclusion is drawn from a sentence, which is its straightforward continuation, its direct application, all possibilities of error are exhausted, and only after each of these has been considered a triumph of the spirit for a while does it become clear that it everyone was wrong that the goal was different, an easier one; and now everyone is wondering how it was possible that he didn't see it first. Ultimately, every such development strives for unity. It is impossible that people should permanently remain in a conflict about what is right and what is wrong. Even where it initially appears as if an agreement is out of the question, it finally comes about, in such a way that the new principle that has emerged outweighs the guiding tone of current morality. But the struggles that ultimately lead the new moral principle to victory are fiercer and have a deeper impact on popular development than struggles over the theoretical half of the worldview. The fact whether the sun turns or is fixed, the earth is a sphere or a disk does not affect the well-being of an individual directly. The question of good and bad, on the other hand, immediately arises from the distribution of property, the barriers to marriage, the overall organization of social life, and thus affects the interests of each individual in those places where he is most sensitive. Because ethics do not refer only to the doing and leaving of the individual, but also to the shaping of social relationships, the "social" written on its banner no longer requires mention.

Harald Höffding, one of the finest modern self-observers, once pointed out that views develop much faster than feelings, but that these advanced views only influence people's actions when they relate to existing feelings. From this arise a thousand contradictions and conflicts, which often destroy happiness in life; from this arise the contradictions in moral conviction, which, supported by a tendency, carried by passion, are fought out in the womb of the family and are expressed in divisions, separations and sacrifices. This also gives rise to the various opinions on the great leading social reform ideas, which time itself gives birth to, and which is expressed in the organization of party life, in waste and re-establishment, in division and unification of groups.

For the asserting part of the world view, the individual can claim some subjectivity - at least as long as he keeps his views to himself. Of course, then they are of no particular value. For the postulating part, this is pure nonsense. As soon as the moral outlook manifests itself in actions (and only then does it make sense), the individual must come into conflict with others who have other outlooks, even with the laws of the state. Now, of course, the individual's intellectual independence is never as great as he thinks. Certain fundamental prerequisites are always in common with his time, even with the madman. But the scope for action is still too wide, still much wider than claimed by practically anyone other than the theoretical anarchist, and that is why he lacks meaning. Moral action is very accessible to thought operations, at least in the case of above-average talented people, and the foresight of unfortunate consequences can make an act very detestable.

It would be a very unsuccessful start to deductively develop a new ethical system out of the idea of development with dialectical art, although the task is a very tempting one. Who will succeed in basing the moral views of the educated contemporary people will do more, to show for factual reasons, in which direction and in what way they will undergo a transformation by the theory of evolution to decide what can be held of them in front of the judge's chair of new knowledge and what has to make room for new moral norms.

S. Alexander is the modern ethicist who has deeply grasped the relative validity of all ethics, all duties, all ideals, all the highest moral principles or feelings. After all, he devoted a whole part of his book on moral order and progress² to the description of how the development of moral ideals takes place in mankind. He is beyond the delusion that the prevailing morality has an absolute value, or occupies any exceptional position among the morals documented in historical time.

Even a conservative ethicist like Harald Höffding clearly states that the inner consecration of an action consists solely in the feeling of harmony and unity with the highest of one's own convictions, in the agreement of one's ideas with one's own will. This creates that inner peace that can be stronger than all external resistance and contradiction. What type those high ideas of our own are, does not matter. That feeling of consecration can be combined with beliefs of

2 Moral Order and Progress, 1899.

very different kinds. When Aristotle defended slavery and when Calvin, with Melanchthon's consent, sent the Unitarian Servete to the stake, they both acted out of holy conviction, and the history of actual morality on the globe knows to tell of other things that were and are still valid as ethical precepts, on which today, however, we are serving a prison sentence.

One action that tends to make humanity happier today can be directly opposed to another that tends to make humanity stronger and smarter tomorrow. From different points of view, both are moral - one is Christian-democratic-humanely moral, the other evolutionary moral.

“When a new ideal is finally recognized”, says S. Alexander, “those who do not act on it are bad, those who act on it are good.” Those who were good under the rule of the old ideal can very well be bad under the rule of the new and vice versa.

The old worldview has no objection to the marriage of a consumptive³. She considers her moral, and even occasionally emphasizes the moral task that arises for women, the task of loyal, devoted care. Anyone who has grown up with a modern education and looks out into life with open eyes will see that consumption-addicts usually have children with a very strong predisposition to consumption who die early and cause heartache to their parents, which would not have been possible without their marriage, So, first of all, with the help of a conclusion, he comes to think that a consumptive marriage is unwise, foolish. While he previously valued her by his immediate feelings, his reasoning now rejects it. For him it is considered moral, beautiful, but unwise. The primary and secondary value judgment contradict each other. Our consciousness is, however, uniform, and by means of apperception every new idea joins the system of the old one. In the long run, such a contradiction in the estimation cannot persist. Both value judgments are in conflict. The stronger, or the one that becomes stronger through external support, will win; so there will be a balance in which one of them disappears. At the moment when the idea of the consumptive marriage also gives rise to a feeling of reprehensibility without the need for a conclusion, this deliberative judgment has become an immediate emotional judgment, it has passed into moral

3 [A person with a wasting disease, especially plumonary tuberculosis.]

consciousness. This is by no means to say that it has already had an impact on people's moral actions. For many contemporary people, this never happens, for some only after some time. But it always costs the individual a hard fight with himself before he acts on it for the first time. Only after he has done it one or more times does it stand for his consciousness the moral sentence:

Thou shall not steal.

Certainly, it is easier to declare today's morality to be complete and indulge in airy speculations about free will, conscience, the origin of morality and the emergence of altruism than to listen to the heartbeat of time and to observe all the small shifts to which that moral awareness of the present undergoes itself in a decade, and these are expressed to the same extent in the ordinary conversation, in the short newspaper note, in the novelist sketch, the time drama and the popular literature. Perhaps observing these small facts is better training for the scientific ethicist than studying travel descriptions from inner Africa or experimenting in the physiological-psychological institute. The direction of this shift is already unmistakable: it undeniably amounts to overcoming the dream of the equality of all people and taking into account the facts of inheritance. On the whole it is determined by natural science and in particular by the theory of evolution.

If the pursuit of the ethical development of the present has been unduly neglected by scientific ethics for a long time, it has long failed to be the leader of this development. In their theories, they were held back rather than encouraged, thus giving up part of their power. "A system of ethics," says Williams⁴, "is a part of the environment that affects the individual; his power is lost as little as that of another part of the environment, although the result in the special case also from the character will depend on the individual to whom it is directed."

Friedrich Albert Lange understood ethical materialism to be a moral theory that allows people's moral actions to grow from the individual emotions of his mind and that determines the goal of action not by an imperative idea, but by striving for a desired state. Accordingly, the entire scientific ethics of the present would be ethical materialism if one were to accept such an outdated, crooked expression. In so far as the image of that desired state is contained in it as an ideal, and the

4 Evolutional Ethics, 1893.

direction of one's own action is determined by it, one is not far from an "absolutely valid idea", and it only takes a small step to idealism. It is a dispute and it is not necessary to give any meaning to it. From such discussions there is not even an acceptable definition of the moral that can be achieved much more easily through experience. By dominant morality, the moral imperatives, we understand the sum total of the limitations which the consciousness of a certain period of unrestrained confirmation of the self-drive draws. This does not say anything about the point at which these limitations are to be set, and it cannot say anything, because it is precisely in the incessant shifting of these barriers that there is a history of moral development. The moral development of a community that is not disturbed by external influences leads partly to an expansion, partly to a narrowing of the barriers. The barriers are broken by contact with other such communities or intellectual products such as Roman law, but only in order to immediately arise in a different form with the same tendency to eternal displacement.

It is very fortunate for cultural mankind that the discovery of evolution through natural selection in the competition for the means of existence came into the world in good time before the full practical consequences had been drawn from the ideal of liberalism, the ideal of general human equality, so the damage this ideal has done is at least only partially real. But only evolutionary science can protect humanity from further damage. But one thing is clear, and there is no need to deceive yourself about it: the biggest stone that stands in the way of the triumphal advance of a social economy and ethics based on Darwinism is the fact that it runs counter to the prevailing democracy, liberalism, which is at the forefront of its development in Cobden's teaching. It is still more compatible with the kingdom of God's grace than with the general right to vote, with hero worship more than with mass worship, with individualism than with social democracy.

The term "evolutionary ethics" is not clear. The view that the moral precepts have been dictated to people by a non-human power has not yet been completely overcome in all social strata, not yet in all peoples. As long as this view has not been completely eradicated, the repetition of the sentence that all ethics have developed as well as the modern productive states or the knowledge of the star orbits will be right, and the evolutionary ethics will be the opposite of the

mythological ethics. This designation has nothing to do with Darwin's and Hackel's theory of evolution. The insight that moral life has also evolved and has not been brought to humanity as something ready to be spread, generally can be safely left to progressive education, and to continue to justify and expand determinism in all directions must be left to individual psychological research.

Since the entire building of scientific knowledge has probably received its final style through the idea of the evolution of organic life, the psychological life of man has also appeared in a completely new light. Biology, and especially anthropogeny, have breathed new life into psychology. All concepts of purpose in it, even if they are not yet extinct, are still in constant retreat, and the comparison of human will with the will of animals, human action with the action of animals, has led us deeper into the understanding of human will and action. The denial of free will, in which mythological ethics believed, the neglect of the responsibility of the criminal, on which cruel punishments like mutilations were based, have been the direct consequences of the penetration of the theory of evolution into the basic problems of ethics.

Ultimately, the ideal of humanity and socialism has grown out of the teaching that all people are God's children and are equal before him, that all people have the same right to exist, the same value in existence, and this ideal has had a major impact on action in the past and current century. This ideal is incompatible with evolutionary theory. She has to break with it as soon as she becomes aware of her immediate consequences. She knows only the able and the unfit, the healthy and the sick, geniuses and atavists. In place of the well-being of all people who live on earth today, you must take a bright future of the most developed [entwickelten] race. And just as humanism and socialism have attempted to derive norms for individual action from the equality of all people, so an ethics that is completely based on the theory of evolution will try to do the same with its ideal of the future of race. Such ethics, however, are evolutionary ethics in the highest sense, and in this sense alone should the word evolutionary ethics be used. But the man who succeeds in finding these norms and dressing them in the formula that sweeps away the masses and inspires them for the new ideal that evolutionary teaching has shown, will instruct the history of spiritual life, the history of morality, its place alongside Moses, Buddha and Jesus.

Nature has no conscious purposes, no conscious goals. Only man as a thinking being sets such, yes he also sets a goal in his ideal for humanity. According to the prevailing view, this ideal exists either in civilization or culture or (which is sometimes identified with this expression) in a social state in which all people have a good living and love each other. What is culture? asked Rousseau and so does Nietzsche. We answer: the process of accumulation of intellectual and material goods that has given shape to today's life without growing new abilities in human beings or raising it to a higher level of strength and organization, yes in some respects, such as in relation to life comfort, vision, hearing, as a result of the suspension of natural selection from religious prejudice, perhaps even a weakening of the average person. But is this "goal of culture" identical to the goal that the evolutionary process would have reached without the entry of "culture", i.e. without the person having acquired the ability to propagate the spiritual results of his activity, and finally the methods for obtaining them by means of a tradition that takes place outside the process of generation? Of course, when we speak of a goal of evolution, this does not mean that nature is a thinking being and has a specific plan that it has implemented over the millennia by means of certain chosen means, but it only means that forces observed in the past, which have been experienced in human evolution and have raised them to such a high level, have so far had this particular success. If, as we can see, they still persist, it can be assumed that their success will remain the same in the future. We call this success, which we can almost certainly predict by means of probabilities, the goal of evolution under a human image.

In this sense, the goal of evolution is to uplift and magnify the human race. And nothing else can be the ultimate moral ideal. With the establishment of every other ideal, man steps outside of natural development and rebels against nature. If there are no moral norms that are innate to us like our instincts, there is this moral ideal that the advance of knowledge of nature has had to reveal to us, and it is easy to obtain clear and simple norms for human action. From the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the people, from the people to the comrades of the faith, to the cultural nations, from the cultural peoples to mankind - this has been the development of the ethical perspective in brief to this day. A further expansion of this circle does not seem possible at first glance, and yet it is: from the living

members of humanity today to the countless thousands of millions of the future. According to human judgment, this is the last and highest step today. Those who place the interests of the coming generation above those of the outgoing should, according to the prevailing views, deserve greater respect today. The parents who sweat and struggle to raise the children to good people who will one day earn their bread at a higher social level are morally higher than the other who uses their own earnings. And if that applies to the small should it not also apply to the large?

An action that is contrary to the well-being of the race, the higher development of the human type, can no longer be considered moral, and if it would be praised by all previous human ethics as moral and was the top priority of Christian moral teaching. If marriage to a crippled woman creates cripples, then it is a curse act, an immoral act, and once prevailing ethics praised it ten times as a heroic act of altruistic courage and sacrifice. What will be called moral in the future must not run counter to the welfare of the race, and the normal actions that promote it will in future have to be regarded as particularly moral.

Encouragement for Darwin's theory of evolution did not come directly from natural sciences, but from sociology. It was Thomas Robert Malthus who fertilized Darwin's thinking with his socio-economic wisdom. At the heart of Malthus' teaching is the fact that the number of eaters continuously exceeds the food scope. There will be more men and antelopes born than there will be food to obtain, and since the antelopes cannot multiply their amount of food at all and humans can only multiply it very slowly, many people and antelopes must die in early adolescence, and only those who can find food can grow. Darwin received so much from Malthus; but now the paths are already going apart.

In the introduction to "The Origin of Species", Darwin says in the third chapter of the book that "the struggle for existence among the organic beings of the whole world is to be considered, which inevitably follows the high geometric multiplication. This is the teaching of Malthus applied to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom. Since many more individuals of all kinds are born than can live, and as a result the struggle for existence is permanent, it follows that any being that deviates from others in a way that is useful to it, often among the

complicated changing living conditions has a more favorable prospect of survival and is therefore chosen by nature for breeding.”

However, Darwin has already introduced a new principle into Malthus' view.

Malthus lived in the time of universal human rights. The social background of Rousseau's teaching had been the call for the elimination of the inherited privileges of two classes. But the ideal formula in which that reputation was clothed did not simply deny those hereditary privileges, but more generally the existence of people who excel above average. She decreed: all people are equal. Although this is not a natural law fact, it can only mean: we democrats at the end of the eighteenth century no longer wants to credit the great, the exceptional people with their advantages, and nor the cripples and other harmful people with their shortcomings, but wants to face us, as if they were all average, and act accordingly. But time is not clear about this difference; for her the sentence of equality of all people becomes dogma.

This creates a conceptions and institutions such as universal suffrage, which are basically based on a fiction and a disastrous one. However, since consciousness at all times is always based far more on the consciousness of the preceding one than on direct observation of reality, and since everyone believes what he thinks to be real, people ultimately think that all people are really the same, and have equal rights, although they might know quite well that they cannot have the same duties. Malthus, who was otherwise so self-reliant, was spellbound by this dogma. He was certain from the outset that all humans were equal for humanity, and the unborn at least potentially. Since a number has to die, it doesn't matter which one, and in order to avoid the ugly death, it is better that those death row inmates are not even born, but remain unprepared. Sexual abstinence is therefore the social panacea.

Darwin was also a democrat and, in his socio-economic outlook, was very close to that of Malthus throughout his life. But the equality dogma was not sacred enough for exact research. If all the young of a species, all the germs that come from a plant, are really the same for the species, for evolution (Darwin took over the concept of evolution from Lamarck while Malthus did not yet know it) - how does it happen that some perish and others survive? The external conditions

certainly play a role, the environment plays a very important role. Hundreds of buttercups bloom and sprout on two streams. Then one brook looks for another bed on the occasion of a high tide, and all the flowers on its previous course are now, when the abundant water has been withdrawn from them, no longer able to cope with the encroaching grass. They die away at his push; however, it cannot protect all of its previous vitality.

But everything isn't explained by the environment. Some overgrow the others from a multitude of plants of the same species, which are under the same conditions of existence. The reason for this must be in them. And it is in them. They got away best when their germs came into being; under particularly favorable conditions, when they ripened as seeds on the stem, which then grew out of the ground, got more power than others who received less juice from the mother plant when their seeds were formed. So the germs are not equivalent for development. Malthus, Darwin and Spencer agree that even at the lowest rate of increase, competition between individuals of the same species must necessarily occur. Darwin adds to this insight the sentence that among them the most adapted to the conditions of existence survive. The others perish in the competition for the means of existence. This is natural selection. This principle is reinforced in the animal world by the sexual selection, according to which the male who has proven to be the strongest in the struggle for life and death often comes to mate with the all-coveted female.

Malthus had mainly spoken of the human world. Darwin had applied his knowledge primarily to the flora and fauna. Should he limit them to this, or was it not already from the point on which all his natural philosophical speculation emanated, the temptation was given from the outset to measure human beings by what had otherwise proven to be a fact in the living world and to proclaim the selection of the most able and the elimination of the least as a great moral law? Because people were not equal to each other, there were no obstacles in the way. Today this line of thought is clearly before our eyes. What should determine us to stop in the middle of that chain and to exempt the person who, as we know today, is only a living being like the others from that law? And yet this chain of conclusions only came about through the most strenuous intellectual work of an entire generation. It took a full thirty years for her head to become so firm that she found expression. For the worldview of the future, the search for this

idea will probably be the most significant feature for the years 1859 to 1890.

Resisting the acknowledgment of natural selection among today's people as a social ethical requirement that has been sustained for two full decades, has something infinitely funny and is not particularly flattering for the logical abilities of today's cultured minds. Incredible! Soon natural selection should no longer be effective in mankind because it should have been replaced by a "natural selection of ideas". Soon the forms of society should be subject to selection, but therefore individuals should no longer be. First Williams says resolutely in 1893:⁵ "Natural selection works with regard to the cell, the individual and all the different social units with which people come together, in their multiplicity of relationships. It does not stop acting on the individuals because they are affected social organizations as little as it stops acting on cells because it affects organisms as a whole."

There was also no shortage of people who turned the tables. What the ethical researcher was unable to make clear in his intellectual work, the Protestant pastor felt with a sure sense that the faith was threatened here. From the fact that the principles of Darwinism run counter to Christian ethics, one immediately concluded that those principles must be wrong. Rudolf Virchow thoughtlessly uttered the sentence that Darwinism was reprehensible simply because it was going to social democracy. Bebel did not ignore this hint and said that Darwinism was an eminently democratic science. The prevailing moral views as an argument against the correctness of a new discovery! This is reminiscent of invoking common sense over the cheeky invention that the earth revolves around the sun, or some other memorable process. If the content of the field of vision in the telescope contradicts Aristotle, then the telescope is always wrong first, and a tremendous spiritual progress is required to finally put Aristotle in the wrong.

"Natural research does not care and does not have to worry about the ethical implications of its discoveries," says Bartholomäus von Carneri in his excellent book "Morality and Darwinism" (1871), "all its activity is directed towards this in the realms of nature To investigate the truth and to proclaim every found truth, publicly to

5 A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution, 1893

science, to this valuable treasure trove of humanity, to hand it over". The opposite is therefore to be argued. If the ethical views of the present cannot be combined with the established knowledge in the scientific field, then they have to be changed. The recognition of the incompatibility of the two then matures, and thus a division takes place in scientific ethics. Church ethics resolutely throws away the new knowledge with which it has already begun to wonder about; consistent thinking reaches the conclusion that all those false ideals must be replaced by new ones derived from that certain knowledge.

Charles Darwin made it very clear that the theory of evolution founded by him must bring about a complete change in the general worldview, both in terms of its theoretical and its ethical side. In his scientific works, however, this is not necessarily clearly stated; but towards the end of his life it emerges more and more. If he had completely avoided such perspectives in "The Origin of Species" (1859), such points of view are already more prominent in "The Descent of Man" (1871). The book gives him repeated opportunities also to speak of the spiritual ascent of man. His letters give even more eloquent testimony to this. They also provide direct evidence that it was only wise - perhaps a little overdone - caution that held him back with those convictions. Including his statements outside of his works allows a certain degree of gradation in this regard, and we can certainly assume that he has not yet said his last word, even in the most radical of them.

In a nutshell, about natural selection in today's human world, or about social selection, are the two questions that follow from it: Is there a social selection under today's social conditions of civilized mankind? and what arrangements are to be made to ensure that it is as effective as possible? Darwin has thought of the first question in several places, but his answer is now negative, now positive. By answering the second, he would have become a social-ethical reformer. But he didn't answer them and so didn't add a new title to his titles of fame.

Darwin believed that herd instincts increased through heredity; for he believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics; but he did not believe in their increase as a result of the action of natural selection, at least not to a great extent. "When I look to the generations to come," he says, "there is no fear that the herd instincts might weaken, and we can expect that the virtuous life will increase, perhaps even becoming fixed by heredity. In this case the quarrel between our higher and

lower motives will become less sharp, and virtue will triumph.” On the other hand, he says again: “Among civilized peoples, natural selection, insofar as the advanced level of morality and the increased number of average good people are taken into account, does little, although the basic social instincts were originally acquired through it.”

In a private conversation towards the end of his life, Darwin completely denied modern cultural institutions the privilege of being socially selected, albeit on the basis of only superficial observations. In fact, they do restrict natural selection considerably, but do not completely abolish it. A people whose social institutions they completely neutralize, e.g. through sharp hereditary castes, the boundaries of which can in no case be jumped, must naturally perish as a whole and fall prey to a foreign tribe, in which the selection of the most capable continues to raise the average of the achievements.

In one of the last conversations Alfred Russell Wallace had with him, Darwin expressed very little hope of the future of mankind on the basis of the observation that in our modern civilization natural selection does not take place and the fittest do not survive. He justified this by saying that he is the winner in the fight for money, who soars with iron energy and who is not discouraged by anything, until they finally get a high risk premium, and not for the better; and he wisely pointed out, that our population has been recruited more and more from the lower classes in every generation.⁶ But this argument is erroneous. Through that iron self-discipline and the immense concentration of their intellectual powers on their subject, those men prove to be those best adapted to the means of existence, as the most capable, behind whom e.g. the scholar with his inferior ability to assert himself is far behind.

However, modern civilization has several features that directly counteract the selection of the most capable. Above all, the prevailing right of inheritance, which ensures the son of the rich man his advancement and procreation, even if he is a lousy rascal; and then the systematic preservation of all sick and weak and the granting of marriage permission to them. However, our culture is not entirely able to neutralize selection. In spite of our inheritance, whole families of more productive people move up to the upper

6 Alfred Russel Wallace, *Human Selection*, *Fortnightly Review* Oct 1891.

classes incessantly, but usually only over the course of several generations: that is proof of the existence of a selection, but not, as Darwin thinks, proof against it. Darwin arrives at his two strange assertions through a strange mix-up, for which he is of course not to blame, but which he took over from Herbert Spencer, through whom it was introduced into the whole of modern ethics, insofar as these in their methods of moralizing the Humanity draws upon evolution. In the place of the most naturally able, Darwin unconsciously places those who most correspond to the prevailing moral ideals, and because the bearer of those Christian qualities of humility and self-denial is usually an extremely inferior specimen for the struggle for existence, he comes to the conclusion that the most able in battle did not survive for money.

At no point does Darwin deal directly with the problem of social selection in modern human society or its reform from this point of view. Apparently he deliberately avoided this because he feared, not without reason, that it would offend him. This is proven by some side observations and side considerations, which presuppose a certain view of the main question. Of course, he contradicts the fears which he expressed to his friend Wallace several times; but even with this fear, he has not yet found an incentive to propose socio-economic reforms.

Still completely outside the thought of the possibility of finding the sharpest judge of today's conditions in civilized society, especially in evolutionary theory, Darwin tries here and there to justify this with empty general possibilities for which he is unable to produce any evidence. Williams⁷ sums up ten pages of Darwin's remarks⁸ as follows: "Although in a state of war, where courage is particularly necessary for the existence of the tribe, the bravest must perish in greater numbers than the others and the survival of the least able is thus ensured; the influence of their bravery on others can do far more good than the production of offspring to inherit their bravery. Likewise, pity, although it induces modern society to preserve the weak, is useful in so far as it encourages participation. So, too, the wealth that has to give for intellectual work and which expands the choice of marriage ultimately tends to directly or indirectly obtain the most morally capable." With such remarks in which suddenly "the influence of bravery on others" is intended to offer more than a substitute for the

7 Evolutional Ethics S. II.

8 Descent of Man. S. 199—209.

killing of the bravest, in which the “morally able” (who are mostly the most physically inefficient) are used for the most physically able (who are the only ones), in whom suddenly the elevation is no longer, It cannot be denied that Darwin has again treaded the sloping path of Spencer’s sleight of hand, with which Williams first settled in his book on evolutionary ethics.

At another point Darwin says that the achievements of the philanthropic and spiritually important man for his people could be just as important for their well-being and the decision of their victory in the struggle for existence as the generation of offspring.⁹ There is certainly some truth to this; On the whole, however, an invention and discovery today no longer only benefits one’s own people, but almost immediately the whole of civilized humanity. Every new spiritual achievement is immediately carried beyond the national boundary, while the treasure of one’s own descendants cannot be alienated from a tribe in the same way. Another unnatural argument moves in exactly the same direction, gloom often tends to suicide, violence and quarrelsome result in bloody ends, excessiveness to undermining one’s own life, viciousness to disease and sterility, so that a certain excretion of the worst invested arises.¹⁰ This is of course correct for certain pathological extremes, but in most strata of society violence and contentiousness no longer lead to a bloody outcome, and excess only leads to self-inflicted death when it has long since produced a large number of offspring and has transferred itself to them. Many diseases such as consumption, with some types of madness, are associated with an increased sexual desire, which tends to have the opposite tendency.

Instead of examining the question of how culture and civilization contrasted the uplifting of the human species in every detail, Darwin limited himself to following the emergence of the Christian-humane virtues of compassion, charity, and sincerity. This is also interesting, but compared to that fundamental practical question, it has only a very theoretical value: “If two tribes of primitive men, living in the same country, competed with one another, then under otherwise identical circumstances, the tribe which had the Had the greatest number of courageous, compassionate, and sincere members who were always ready to warn one another of danger, to help and protect

9 Descent of Man. S. 136.

10 Descent of Man. S. 211.

one another, to prosper better and to conquer one another. Selfish and contentious people will not associate, and without association there is nothing align. A tribe rich in the opposite properties had to spread and be victorious over other tribes. In the course of time, however, according to the entire history of mankind, it had to be thrown overboard by an even more highly gifted tribe. So the social and moral qualities had to have the tendency to move slowly forward and spread over the earth”.¹¹ That sounds quite plausible, but nevertheless the main point is overlooked, namely that the spread of general participation and sincerity is inseparably linked to a decrease in the individual martial virtues, and that this close association of large masses is not only not superior to a smaller group of better warriors, but is always subject to it. Proof: the defeat of the great, well-organized Persian armies by the divided Greeks, the well-disciplined Roman armies by the Germanic hordes, etc. In addition, Darwin makes the mistake of extending compassion in this sense and its training to a much too early period, while it is a very modern development according to the current state of research.

In the theoretical field Darwin has made great contributions to modern ethics. By declaring moral feeling to be essentially identical with the social instincts of animals, he not only solved the question of the origin of altruism, but he did more; he showed that it is not younger than egoism, but that it is already found, as far as we go down on the levels of the animal world. Since then, there are no longer two abstract principles facing each other. It is not necessary to educate people from selfishness to selflessness, but rather to sacrifice the instant pleasure of permanent satisfaction. The anthropological school in modern religious studies regards the religious as a part of the human, in contrast to the hardly overcome rationalism. Darwin understands morality in this deeper sense. Turning against Kant and his successors, he says¹²: “I know very well that some people do not count actions that happen impulsively to the moral ones. On the other hand, however, we all feel that an action is only then as completed or as noble in the It is to be considered in the highest sense when it happens impulsively, without prior deliberation or a rousing, as in a person who is innate with the necessary characteristics”. For Darwin, the moral is part of the human and as such has its independent right.

11 *Descent of Man*. S. 199.

12 *The Descent of Man*. S. 170.

“Morality arises and is not made,” says Leslie Stephen. It is the fruit of the gradual development of the organic instinct of many generations. Even the teachings of the greatest moral teacher can only fall on fertile ground insofar as they are related to the prevailing feelings and in them find an echo. Since the tallest person always remains a child of his time, this is relatively often the case.

Darwin has also formed an opinion on other moral ethical questions. According to his definition, it is the office of moral consciousness to tell us what to do, and the office of conscience - that gives it guilt, remorse, regret and shame, fear of the gods and disapproval of fellow men - to blame us when we disobey him.¹³ The aim or purpose of the moral is for him more the general good than the general happiness, “although the welfare and happiness of the individual undoubtedly usually coincide; and a contented, happy tribe will flourish happier than a dissatisfied and unhappy tribe, since every human being strives for happiness, the principle of the greatest possible happiness will become a very important secondary guiding principle and subject, although the herd instinct combined with compassion (which makes us approve or disapprove of other’s actions), has served as the primary drive and guide.”¹⁴

In his views on the norms of human action, Darwin was thoroughly on the ground of his time. He vaguely felt that the Christian-humane-democratic ethics with his doctrine of competition for the means of existence as the driving force of all progress did not get along, even if his attention was too much turned to the theoretical part of the general worldview to be able to think this thought through in detail. With this dichotomy and its awareness, however, the leitmotif for the whole further development of evolutionary ethics is given, as it comes to light in Spencer, Huxley, Wallace, Häckel, Carneri and Nietzsche.

13 The Descent of Man. S. 174 and 178.

14 The Descent of Man. S. 185.

Overcoming Happiness-Utilitarianism.