




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The Rogue of All Rogues: Nietzsche's Presentation of Eduard von Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* and Hartmann's Response to Nietzsche

ANTHONY K. JENSEN

Before now there has been no study in English devoted exclusively to the relation between Eduard von Hartmann and Friedrich Nietzsche.¹ What few mentions have appeared in the secondary literature come to us more often than not in the form of discussions of Nietzsche and psychology in general.² Hartmann was, however, one of the first psychologists whose works Nietzsche read a great deal.³ Over time, Nietzsche came to own six large volumes of his writings, two of which remain in his private library, and many pages of which bear Nietzsche's marginal notes.⁴ His name and thought appear prominently in part 2 of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" (hereafter HL), and even more so in his *Nachlass* and personal correspondence.⁵ Nietzsche's interest in Hartmann endured throughout his career.⁶ Moreover, Hartmann was himself one of the earliest commentators on Nietzsche, having already in 1891 and 1898 published articles on Nietzsche's so-called *neue Moral*.⁷ His significance as a psychologist and the importance of his *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*) to Nietzschean scholarship thus stands assured but too often unrecognized.⁸

This neglect, however, is not without cause: the overgrown thicket of Nietzsche's relation to Hartmann is difficult to traverse because of the exceedingly sarcastic manner in which Nietzsche consistently portrays him. Nietzsche declaims Hartmann as a *Schalk* or a *Schelm*, designations best translated as "rogue," or "knave," or "jester." But it is at best unclear why he repeatedly chose to do so, what meaning these terms have, or why Hartmann merited such an obfuscated treatment. In this essay, I will discuss Hartmann's thought and will suggest several motivations for Nietzsche's peculiar presentation of it. Then, I will outline and assess Hartmann's criticisms of Nietzsche. Finally, I will determine what, if any, positive influence there may have been between the two thinkers upon one another, something that I hope will contribute to a better understanding of Nietzsche's psychology and of the latter chapters of *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*.

A Psychologist among Historians

Our first piece of this relationship's puzzle is uncovered when we notice the location of the discussion in which Nietzsche situates Hartmann: the antepenultimate chapter of his 1874 HL. But why would Nietzsche place a critical discussion of a psychologist within an essay on history? To answer this we must first familiarize ourselves with Hartmann's position in the history of thought because he is a relative unknown in the English-speaking world. Although there is no doubt Hartmann considered himself a psychologist, something not identical with today's version thereof, he was equally concerned with ethics, theology, modern physics, history, and especially the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Hegel. His thoughts on these varying topics, though, were systematically rooted in what he called the psychological *Weltanschauung*, where he—not unlike Nietzsche—sought to uncover the drives and motivations at work in those who populate such fields of thought and in the masses affected by them, what motivations lead to which resulting actions, and what instincts drive which cultures to what ends. As such, he was regarded in a light similar to that of his immediate contemporary Wilhelm Wundt, widely vaunted as the father of modern psychology, who also published on logic (1880–83) and ethics (1886) and even a work of systematic philosophy (1889).⁹ More the experimentalist, Wundt would later transform the speculative psychology of Hartmann—and, for that matter, of someone like Nietzsche—into the empirical discipline more generally accepted today.

In a manner that echoes Hegel, Hartmann characterizes his own work as the “Striving for Spiritual Monism,” tracing the ascension of the self from its minimal unfolding of *Selbstgefühl* (self-awareness) to the summits of *reines Selbstbewusstsein* (pure self-consciousness).¹⁰ He held that the unity of the Unconscious is not reducible to the Conscious because the Unconscious lies ever under the Conscious as the essence of the organism, finding expression only through the psychological apparatus of Conscious representation. Awareness of the Unconscious as the motivating force of Conscious activity cannot fully be wrought from the methods of empirical research or from a priori speculation but, rather, is only ever partially revealed through a measured phenomenological analysis of its workings a posteriori. The impetus of the Unconscious is apprehended most clearly when we observe from the vantage point of historical reflection the various teleologically progressive epochs in the dynamic processes of life and the world. Neither the Kantian a priori nor Humean empiricism but, instead, a dialectical phenomenology imbued with a deep historical sense could alone begin to approach a comprehension of the unconscious aspects of human life. Such was what Hartmann considered the proper methodology of the psychologist.

Through the dialectic of continuing *Zusichkommen*, Hartmann sought to uncover in the end the *geistige Ursache* (spiritual source) of the Unconscious in the purposiveness of nature—a Metaphysical Unconscious—that he found rooted in the interpenetration of the God of Christian spirituality and the mechanical laws of nature.¹¹ The character of fate or providence, whose hold over human and indeed all animate activity is firm, is in this way explicable in terms the theologian and the scientist can each recognize.¹² The interrelation of the Conscious’s participation in the material world and the individual Unconscious’s participation in the omnipresent Metaphysical Unconscious (again, in terms that recall Hegel), “sublimates the radical difference between spirit and material . . . and not through the elimination of the spirit, but by the invigoration of the material.”¹³ Spiritual providence, revealed through the Metaphysical Unconscious, somehow actually causes the enhancement or degradation of selected material characteristics of the human organism and of the species toward ends that remain partly unknowable but ever fated for that organism or species. In sum, the Unconscious always unfolds itself into the realm of conscious knowing according to the Will of the Divine.

Schopenhauer, in the framework of whose metaphysics Nietzsche at that time still lingered, had ample space to accommodate the Philosophy of the Unconscious and did, in fact, make considerable progress toward its principles by means of his psychological adaptations of Kant. But Schopenhauer was blinded, Hartmann believes, by his rather uncomfortable allegiance to the confines of the Kantian notion of subjectivity, by his juvenile distaste for Schelling, and, most unfortunately, by his unwillingness to adapt his notion of the Will to accommodate the manifest designs of nature.¹⁴ This hesitancy prevented Schopenhauer from recognizing that his adaptation of Kant’s *Ding-an-sich*, named Will, just requires purposiveness in the sense of directedness, without which Will would prove meaningless or at best an empty placeholder. For if Will is to be recognized in its material objectification as the simultaneous conglomeration of *unconscious* desires, drives, and instincts, all of which are “aimed” in some sense, then it would be self-contradictory to believe it could be so guided by an act of Consciousness. If Will is thus directed, but not so through our own conscious efforts, then this in turn presupposes, Hartmann maintained, that the Unconscious Will of Nature (the Metaphysical Unconscious), which is composed of the sum total of all individual unconscious Wills, be ordered by that same force that directs the individual Unconscious. These directing powers Hartmann names the Immanent Divine.¹⁵ Schelling sensed this in his Transcendental Idealism and connected its conception to the inviolability of the Divine in his Philosophy of Nature, but he did not take the final step that would locate in the objectification of conscious activity the foreground of the Metaphysical Unconscious.¹⁶

The failure of the philosophers up through Hegel to regard both the conscious and the unconscious aspects of subjectivity, Hartmann claimed, embedded a regrettable oversight in other areas of their philosophical systems. Ignoring the purposes of the Metaphysical Unconscious within the processes of nature, they could not grasp the manner in which history has progressed as the unfolding of the “I” by the ever further encroachment of conscious knowing upon the Unconscious domain according to that divine plan.¹⁷ As a remedy, Hartmann posits the Divine Will as the guarantor of the historical *Weltprozess* through the medium of the Metaphysical Unconscious, in which every particular Unconscious participates. Through it, we are to understand how human action is motivated to accomplish the goals of nature. As humankind over the spans of history recognizes to an increasingly conscious degree what those goals are and discovers through its own powers of reflection how to accomplish them, its reliance on Unconscious dictates proportionately decreases. Humankind now consciously works to accomplish what it was once only unconsciously driven to achieve. Thus, the age in which Hartmann found himself, because of its manifest dependence on conscious rational reflection over and above the instinctual or “blind” willing, reveals itself to be the most complete articulation of the goals of the Divine Will.

By way of his psychotheodicy, his tying of the motivations within a particular Unconscious to the binding necessity of Divine Will, Hartmann explicates his teleological vision of history:

For the aims of the individual are always selfish, each one seeks only to further his own well-being, and if this conduces to the welfare of the whole, the merit is certainly not his. . . . But the wonderful part of the matter is, that even in the mind, which wills the bad but works the good, the results become, by combination of many selfish purposes, quite other than each individual had imagined, and that in the last resort they always conduce to the welfare of the whole, although the advantage is somewhat remote, and centuries of retrogression seem to contradict it.¹⁸

Just as for Hegel, all human activity for Hartmann works toward the fulfillment of the Absolute. The force of egoism and personal volition is dispelled for both as a mere means to justify ends humankind did not intend but cannot avoid. As the most rational era on record, the present epoch is viewed not only as the perfection of history so far but also as the last advancement possibly achieved. Whatever evils spring up despite the preponderance of conscious reflection and even those that arise because of it at the expense of unconscious instinct in this age are to be seen as necessary. As such, Hartmann admits that his is a thoroughly pessimistic view of human activity, one in which the human being’s only hope rests “in the final redemption from misery of volition and existence into the painlessness of non-being and non-willing.”¹⁹ That is, when the limits of consciously reflected ends have been fulfilled, humankind does not return to a

state of instinctual willing but, instead, moves into a condition of nonwilling, of willing nothingness.

From an entwining of Schopenhauerian pessimism and Hegelian historical absolutism, Hartmann argues that the task of every human, though a miserable one and far from happiness, is to unwittingly do one's part to facilitate this progressive historical fractionation of the Conscious Idea away from the Unconscious Will and, in this age in particular, to bring about the conditions to allow for the "providential end" that is cultural nihilism. And as the individual Conscious gains ever-more influence while unconscious motivations (e.g., instincts) are further and further restrained, the task is to strip away the "happy illusions" of free will and self-determination, leading unavoidably to despair in the conscious realization that the individual is nothing more than a cog in the *Weltprozess*. Whether or not the individual should wish it, the process of history is always served, heedless of that individual's own happiness and sense of self-worth; and thus, the present condition of humankind is analogous to what is called "ripe old age," a condition in which one's hopes and wishes are at last relinquished under the crushing yoke of an accepted futility before the demands of fate, the eventual recognition of the individual's powerlessness to will at all—a recognition that Nietzsche would characterize as "die volle Hingabe der Persönlichkeit an den Weltprozess" [the total sacrifice of individuality to the world process] (HL 9).²⁰

Schalk aller Schalke

Nietzsche's attitude concerning Hartmann's treatment of the Unconscious is guarded by highly stylized rhetoric. At first glance, it is almost tempting to read Nietzsche as though he believed Hartmann was "just kidding" throughout his massive books. After all, in HL 9 alone Nietzsche names him "rogue" or "fool" (*Schelm*) five times, twice "rogue of rogues" or "fool of fools" (*Schalk aller Schalke* or its synonymous *Schelm der Schelme*), "parodist" at least five times, and once even "comedian" (*lustige Person*).²¹ The terms *Schelm* and *Schalk* were typically used to designate clever but mischievous children who put some trick past their parent's eyes and here designate an ambiguous derision: Hartmann is behaving badly, in a sense—but is almost admirably clever in doing so. Nietzsche claims he is "all so deceptively mimicking straight-faced earnestness as though it were a genuine serious-philosophy [*wirkliche Ernst-Philosophie*] and not only a play-philosophy [*Spass-Philosophie*]"—such a production marks its creator as one of the first philosophical parodists of all time" (HL 9). A letter to Rohde in 1874 claims, "[H]e is either a rogue or sheep [*entweder ein Schelm oder ein Schaf*]" (KSB 4:321).²² In later *Nachlass* entries, he is labeled both a "slapdash pinhead" (*oberflächlicher Querkopf*) [KSA

11:236]) and an “emaciated monkey” (*magerer Affe* [KSA 13:30]). This impression is not confined to Hartmann’s *Philosophy of the Unconscious*: a letter to Carl von Gersdorff on May 8, 1874, claims, “*Romeo and Juliet* [another title published by Hartmann] appeared—I can’t spare you—though soon I’ll hear a real hellish laugh [*Höllengelächter*] coming out of your mouth; but then after one has laughed, one has every reason to be quite serious” (KSB 4:223).²³ In short, Nietzsche’s presentation of Hartmann is a *buffo* account of a *buffoon*, a parody of what he declares is a parody. Nietzsche knew quite well that the *Philosophie des Unbewussten* was written with perfect sincerity, that the work was not to be taken as tongue-in-cheek irony, but he still writes as if it were a joke to which he and his friends alone held privileged access, a joke intended to conceal an underlying danger.²⁴

This high sarcasm comes to a head in the form of a contemptuous and quite revealing poem written about Hartmann in 1885. Here Nietzsche parodies Pliny the Younger, who recalls the story of Caecina Paetus’s wife Arria as she stoically stabs herself while concealing from her dying husband the news of the recent death of their son. Upon drawing the sword out of her own breast to give to her husband, in order that he may die with equal dignity, Arria says famously, “Paete, non dolet” [Paetus, it doesn’t hurt].²⁵ In comparing Arria to Hartmann—whom he here calls *ein Mädchen für Alles*—Nietzsche writes in a blend of German and Latin, “Paete, non dolet! Paete, dieser Pessimismus thut nicht weh! Paete, Eduard beisst nicht!” [Paetus, it doesn’t hurt! Paetus, such pessimism doesn’t hurt! Paetus, Eduard doesn’t bite!] (KSA 11:532–33).²⁶ For both Arria and Hartmann, their straight-faced earnestness conceals an underlying dread, a feigned optimism in the face of bitter destruction.

Seldom in Nietzsche’s writing is irony circumstantial, and seldom can it be straightforwardly unpacked. More often it masks a deeper concern. In the present case, I suggest that there are at least three factors motivating Nietzsche’s irony. I would not say that these are the only motivations, only that these three appear prominently. First and most concretely, in 1872 there appeared an anonymous work entitled *Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkt der Physiologie und Descendenztheorie*, which simultaneously praised the general psychological achievements of Hartmann’s *Philosophie des Unbewussten* and criticized its teleological metaphysics as lacking in scientific rigor. Nietzsche owned this anonymous edition, and on its title page, where the author’s name should have appeared, he scratched the words “von Ed. von Hartmann.”²⁷ Only five years later would Hartmann admit that the critical work was his own.²⁸ Notice the chronology here: HL was composed shortly after the anonymous critique appeared but was printed three years before Hartmann confessed its authorship. It was a ruse on the part of Hartmann, it would seem, but one that was not publicly exposed until three years after Nietzsche’s highly sarcastic presentation of him as a “philosophical parodist.” Thus it seems Nietzsche detected that the self-criticism was only a

half-serious parody before Hartmann revealed it as such and chose a particularly sarcastic presentation to convey his suspicions about it.²⁹

The second motivating factor I find behind Nietzsche's ironic presentation involves the relation of Hartmann as an author to the theme of his work. For indeed, it is somewhat ironic that Hartmann, author of *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, failed to at least try to sense the unconscious underpinnings that guided his own actions as a psychologist and as a historian. Hartmann never turns the psychologist's spotlight on himself to imagine why he and the other disciples of Hegel's historical method are unconsciously motivated to perceive themselves and their generation as the most perfect articulation of the world historical process, what instinctual impulses are the foundation of their own conscious representations. Ever concerned with underlying drives and the hidden motivations of thinkers, Nietzsche has searched for the "historical sense" that drives this Hegelianism and believes he has located the roots of what he calls in HL 8 the "ironic self-awareness" of modernity in an unconscious remnant from the Christian belief in a purpose and telos in existence, an idea that leads man to wait on the Last Judgment as the goal of life, "a religion which of all the hours of a man's life holds the last to be the most important." Hartmann was a disciple of this religion, and with the feigned optimism of Hegelian historicity, which maintains that "now" is as it should be and that (no matter how bad) all is "now" the best that ever could be, he pronounces a "cynical sentence" upon mankind: "Austere and profoundly serious reflection on the worthlessness of all that has occurred, on the ripeness of the world for judgment, is dissipated into the skeptical attitude that it is at any rate well to know about all that has occurred, since it is too late to do any better" (HL 8). And when the misery of present life is actually identified as the highest achievement of God's plan, what Nietzsche labels the "cynical canon" (HL 9), such an attitude against life eventually finds expression as an ironic or knavish optimism that heralds that "total sacrifice of individuality to the world-process."³⁰ It is an optimism that believes today is the best day, but it is at the same time a cynical self-parody, for it remains aware that it was founded on the conviction that the evils of the world can become no better—a sort of Panglossian smile turned inward toward its own suffering. The proper means of conveyance for such an "ironic self-awareness," Nietzsche may have felt, is an ironic parody in turn: to show, as it were, that Eduard does not bite.

The third reason is more complicated still and addresses certain similarities between the philosophies of Nietzsche and Hartmann directly. Nietzsche does not portray Hartmann as a straightforward enemy whose conclusions are misguided but, rather, as a jester whose joke not everyone understands correctly as a joke. Indeed, Nietzsche's tone is at times almost sympathetic, at one point lamenting the possibility that anyone could fail to see through the trick as he has: "The thoughtful reader will understand—as if anyone could misunderstand

Hartmann! And how unspeakably amusing it is that he should be misunderstood!" (HL 9). The misunderstanding stems from not seeing the work as a parody, that is, from taking it in earnest. This suggests to me that there was for Nietzsche yet something worth retaining in Hartmann's thought, only that it must be viewed correctly through the veil of his rhetoric. The character of this value, I believe, is again indicated by Nietzsche's presentation of Hartmann within his own essay on history, a work that is not itself history in a strict sense but seeks to uncover the unconscious motivations, drives, and instincts of the various manifestations of historians and what effect "historical sense," itself a less-than-conscious impulse, has had on his contemporary Germans. That is to say, Nietzsche's *Betrachtung* is more psychological than historical, and the major precedent for a "history of drives" (a title that Nietzsche himself once planned to write) is Hartmann's psychohistory. With respect to the abiding influence of the Unconscious on the conscious actions of human beings, Nietzsche and Hartmann largely agree: the search for what lies under the surface of human activity was preeminent for both—just as it was for Schopenhauer, whom both regarded as a forerunner in this respect.³¹ Although Nietzsche takes this style of psychology further in applying such methods to the historians of the drives themselves, he agrees with Hartmann regarding the often overlooked but utterly indispensable role speculative psychological analysis must play in historical and social studies. Such a commonality in aims, I believe, restricted Nietzsche from a more straightforward invective, converting the tone of his critique from malicious to ironic.

Furthermore, Hartmann drew heavily on Schopenhauer's conception of subjectivity. This was well known in the learned circles of the day. Because this was a framework in which Nietzsche at this time still operated, he was again held back from a more direct assault on Hartmann, for this would have also appeared as an assault on Schopenhauer. The ambivalence of Nietzsche's attitude is similar to that of Cosima Wagner, who once wrote him, "It seems to me that what he stole from Schopenhauer is good, and whatever was his own is bad" (*KGB* II/2:124).³² Hartmann considered himself a follower of Schopenhauer—but in Nietzsche's eyes he was not a very good one. A notebook entry from 1884 claims, "To me it seems a sign of 'The Poor in Spirit' to name Schopenhauer and Hartmann in one breath" (*KSA* 11:81). Hartmann's tendency to simultaneously "plunder" and "corrupt" Schopenhauer forced Nietzsche into an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, Nietzsche realized that his own view of subjectivity bore certain similarities to the thought of Hartmann, for they each claimed a common influence. But on the other hand, Hartmann held an interpretation of Schopenhauer so contrary to his own that it must just be wrong. Nietzsche would not at this time accept that the "cultural danger" presented by Hartmann's worldview was traceable to Schopenhauer. The result was another reason for Nietzsche's deliberately obfuscated presentation, which tries to avoid a direct

attack on Hartmann because this would be in essence an attack on his own *Erzieher*. By portraying Hartmann as a *Schelm* and a *Schalk*—as a mischievous but clever child who put a trick past his parents' eyes—Nietzsche tried to make it seem as though Hartmann knew Schopenhauer well enough to be able to write an extended parody that would fool some into thinking his own interpretation was serious.

Although the parody seems a mere *Spas-Philosophie* to those who saw through the veil, namely, to Nietzsche and his friends, for those who understood it as an *Ernst-Philosophie* the psychohistory posed a real threat. Nietzsche thinks that in attributing a causal role in human affairs to some divine Metaphysical Unconscious that unfolds its ends throughout a historical process, Hartmann has not only parted ways with Schopenhauer, but he has also reduced the individually objectified Will, the very essence of life for both Schopenhauer and the young Nietzsche, to nothing more than an arbitrary expression of the Metaphysical Unconscious.³³ The result of this, thinks Nietzsche, is that for Hartmann there is nothing actual for the individual to press his Will upon, no goal that he can set for himself—in short, nothing left to do. What is more, the expression of individual Will does not significantly affect history or culture in any period of world history but, rather, only contributes in a miniscule way to the unfolding of universal and already determined cultural, historical, philosophical, or even biological and environmental movements. The individual has no role left to play. It is history told from the perspective of the masses:

The time will come when one will prudently refrain from all constructions of the world-process or even of the history of humanity; a time when one will regard not the masses but individuals, who form a kind of bridge across the turbulent stream of becoming. These individuals do not carry forward any process but live ever-contemporaneously [*zeitlos-gleichzeitig*] with one another; thanks to history, which permits such a collaboration, they live as that “Republic of Genius” of which Schopenhauer once spoke; one giant calls to another across the desert intervals of time and, undisturbed by the excited chattering dwarfs who creep about beneath them, the exalted spirit-dialogue [*Geistergespräch*] goes on. It is the task of history to be the mediator between them and thus to ever again inspire and lend the strength for the production of the great man. No, the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end, but only in its highest exemplars. (HL 9)

Contrary to Hartmann, Nietzsche believes that history is to be told from the point of view of exemplars and not of the masses, that the greatness of antiquity is to be considered among the highest modes of civilization rather than as a merely curious preliminary step on the ladder of universal progress, that history is to be considered a bridge among exemplary individuals and not some goal-orientated process in whose outcome they play no role, and that whatever development can be ascribed to history is the result of the willful competition among individuals and not the unconscious will of God toward His divine ends.³⁴ On Nietzsche's view of history, the individual Will appears as a catalyst that through

struggle with other competing Wills brings about the continuous alteration and fluctuation, but not always the betterment or advancement, of the forms of life. For Nietzsche, the Will always seeks the increase of its own power; for Hartmann, only its surrender to the Metaphysical Unconscious. As Nietzsche says of Hartmann's conception of the Will, "Thus does it labor for the extension of misery: and indeed afterwards it understands that the entire Will is essential misery! Thus its advancement is either madness or else evil" (*KSA* 10:312).³⁵

History for both thinkers is a question of value, and this is in part, for both, a psychological question. For Nietzsche, a central value of history lies in its capacity to show forth exemplary individuals and ideas with the hope that the student of history will be made aware that such greatness once existed and may yet once more exist.³⁶ Like all facets of culture, history should serve life by preparing the way for the great individuals of the future. The value of history for Hartmann, on the other hand, lies in revealing that the present day could be no better. The "excess of historical sense" on display within the writings of Hartmann and the Hegelians, with their own unconscious impulse to see in every tribal migration, every nationalist revolution, and every technological discovery the signs of the all-encompassing world process, to see the present day as the last day, reveals which values are held by their authors. It is not the case that Nietzsche thinks this approach is "wrong" (in the sense that it does not have its facts straight)—but again, he asks, "[W]hat drives must a person have to express matters thusly?" His answer is clear, if hyperbolic: someone so disgusted by the present day that his cynicism has been unconsciously transformed into a roguish parody.³⁷ But as he had written to Carl von Gersdorff, one now has every reason to be quite serious. For in his notes Nietzsche would write, "The Hartmannian goal is to lead humanity into placidity [*Blasiertheit*]: then, general suicide. . . ! Then will the world capsize and sink further into the sea of nothingness" (*KSA* 7:650). The danger of Hartmann is the danger of nihilism. Nietzsche's presentation of Hartmann, then, like his critiques of other figures, involves regarding him as a degenerate personality type whose thought is a dangerous hindrance to the development of a healthy culture. In one of his final words on Hartmann, Nietzsche groups his theory of the Unconscious alongside Dühring's anti-Semitism as the two most insidious German poisons.³⁸ The irony, indeed the ironic pseudosympathy Nietzsche sometimes shows, is to obfuscate the fact that this danger is partly traceable to Schopenhauer.

Nietzsche's *Neue Moral*

The rhetorical maze that marked Nietzsche's critique would not go unanswered, though it would take a while.³⁹ In 1891, a noticeable seventeen years after the publication of *HL*, and at a time when there was no longer much danger of

retribution from the afflicted Nietzsche, Hartmann published “Nietzsches ‘neue Moral’” in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*.⁴⁰ The title reappeared, though in an altered form, in an 1898 collection of his essays entitled *Ethische Studien*.⁴¹ Both works deal primarily with the ethical position Hartmann believes Nietzsche explicated in *Zarathustra*, specifically, the relation of the aristocratic, great, or healthy individuals to the herd, plebian, or degenerate within society. In the 1891 offering, Hartmann finds this position latent in Nietzsche’s early attachment to only the most “unsavory aspects” of Schopenhauer’s philosophy—the Buddhism, the misogyny, and the childish fascination with egoistic immorality. This is an interpretation of Schopenhauer that Hartmann considered himself to have already fortuitously advanced beyond.⁴² Nietzsche mistakes Schopenhauer’s criticisms of organized Christianity, Hartmann says, for an overt hostility to all forms of teleology and directed processes within nature, and as such he overemphasizes the differences between Schopenhauer and Hegel, instead of properly regarding them as “brother geniuses,” whose philosophies are necessarily dependent on one another (as Hartmann believed his philosophy had already demonstrated): Hegel dependent on Schopenhauer’s discovery of an Unconscious Will, and Schopenhauer dependent on Hegel’s *Weltprozess* to name the direction in which Will is necessarily pointed.⁴³ Nietzsche understood none of this, childishly highlighting only those passages of Schopenhauer that glorify the sovereignty of the Will. Indeed, to support his declamation Hartmann would have been well served to quote Nietzsche’s infamous dictum, “[E]goism shall be our god” (HL 9).

Hartmann offers two main criticisms in his 1891 article. First, with his notion of the all-encompassing Will to Power, Nietzsche portrays the great individuals of the world, *Übermenschen*, whether these be artists, philosophers, or political leaders (or whether this is even an attainable ideal), as mandated by some right to be the commanders and legislators of all the values on the earth.⁴⁴ But as Nietzsche himself pointed out, such sovereignty is vested in an individual Will whose workings can never be revealed entirely, and whatever manifestations of it arise are more often than not the expression of its force only as it is concealed behind one or many layers of “mask.” How should “absolute egoism” or the “tyranny of individuality,” as Hartmann names it, be the rule if such an ego lies forever masked beyond our comprehension? And if the ego within is beyond our understanding and thus our power to command, then surely some intelligence lies without to control it—but this is just what Hartmann finds Nietzsche denying with his “death of God.” Whether this objection is sound, Hartmann feels himself confident in having proven that “in general, Nietzsche is meaningless for the history of philosophy.”⁴⁵

The second shortcoming of Nietzsche is that his so-called *neue Moral* was not in fact very new at all. The vaunted “revaluation of all values,” accomplished—Hartmann claims—by the absolute egoism of a sovereign individual, was very much prefigured by the anarchist social philosopher Max Stirner. It is

claimed, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that the *Übermensch* is itself the “unconscious” revelation of Stirner’s idea of the anarchic “I.” In 1845, Stirner had published his equally controversial and influential book *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (*The Individual and Its Proprietorship*), in which he asserts the following analogy: The dialectic of individual growth—from a Realistic “childhood” that is wholly restrained by material forces, to an Idealistic adolescence that is marked by the self-discovery of the mind as it attempts to outwit and thereby overcome those material constraints, both of which are finally sublimated to an adulthood of Egoism that values only its personal satisfaction and whatever material or spiritual property that are conducive to it—is analogous to the dialectic of successive epochs of world history, from cultural Realism (ancient), to Idealism (Christian), and finally to Egoism (post-Hegelian). The third term in each side of this analogy is *Egoism*. But this is not simply the descriptive claim that individuals or societies act in their own self-interest; egoism entails more than that. For Stirner, the goal of human striving is a self-autonomy whereby the individual is free from the siren song of material wealth or avariciousness and only ever seeks what is its *eigentum* (proprietorship). The consequence of this self-rule entails a far-reaching rejection of conventional morality, it is true, but only when this is understood as some normative code of behavior. Such a solipsistic morality Hartmann names the *Libertinage der souveränen Laune des Individuums* (libertinage of the sovereign caprice of the individual).⁴⁶ Much of this he claims to have found in Nietzsche.

This brings us to the harsher, shriller 1898 formulation of Hartmann’s criticism, in which four complaints stand out prominently. First, not only is the vision of the *Übermensch* that Nietzsche propagates in *Zarathustra* consistent with Stirner’s radical egoism, as Hartmann had already asserted, but the two are so close that Nietzsche must have been “plagiarizing” him all along. Second, the Stirner–Nietzsche position on the absolute status of the “I” is one that only the most adolescent and immature temperaments could approve: certainly nothing appealing to an established man of society. Third, by equal measures of his preference for the so-called romance philosophies of France and Italy over the systematic efforts of the Germans and of his ill temper toward objectivity in deference to the whimsical demands of subjectivity, Nietzsche has exposed in himself a tendency that he himself rails against: Nietzsche and the followers of the *neue Moral* forward an “effeminized” philosophy.⁴⁷ Finally, Nietzsche’s own illness was itself a psychosomatic response to his “pathological cholera” or “moral insanity.”⁴⁸

When this second critique appeared in 1898, Nietzsche was in no condition to respond. We may do so for him. Now, we know that Nietzsche knew of Stirner’s book and may have read it,⁵⁷ but the claim of plagiarism is based around scattered and generalized similarities in either their thoughts or else the rhetoric used to express them, and even these depend on less than orthodox interpretations of

both Nietzsche and Stirner.⁴⁹ Whatever tonal similarities may exist between the formulation of the *Übermensch* and the “Absolute I” are almost certainly accidental and at any rate incidental. Moreover, there is no mention of Stirner in Nietzsche’s corpus. The other criticisms are *ad hominem* and crass but do represent an early formulation of what soon became popular prejudices against Nietzsche. I cannot address them in any depth here or say more about Nietzsche’s supposed reading of Stirner. What I think is important to see is that, in the later work, Hartmann does to Nietzsche what Nietzsche had done to him in 1874; namely, he criticizes the psychological motivations and effectual cultural ramifications of Nietzsche’s position (or what he perceived these to be) rather than questioning the validity of those positions.⁵⁰ His analysis of Nietzsche is, on the one hand, psychological and, on the other, cultural. Hartmann finds Nietzsche’s ethical position as effectually dangerous for society and as fueled by degenerate drives as Nietzsche had found his position on the unconscious goals of history. If Hartmann’s philosophy, driven by pessimism, would lead to mass suicide, then Nietzsche’s, driven by an emasculated dissoluteness, would bring about anarchy. In sum, Hartmann was more concerned with the *Nutzen und Nachtheil* of Nietzsche’s ethics *für das Leben*. Whether he apprehended these correctly or charitably is another matter.

The Question of Influence

It will hopefully be clear by now that through their polemics against one another, Nietzsche and Eduard Hartmann each left a significant impression on the other; but it is another thing to speak of any lines of influence between them. In the case of Hartmann, it is doubtful that he altered any of his thought to appropriate what he perceived was “Nietzscheanism,” at least not in any positive way. Whether fairly or not, he attacks Nietzsche as the voice of a more general tendency in social philosophy and ethics, one that he saw begun by Max Stirner. But this trend of the *neue Moral* was a direction of philosophy that he never so much accommodated as he did reject. As for Nietzsche, it is true that references to a theory of the Unconscious can be found as early as 1862, thus predating by six years the emergence of Hartmann; that his own mature conception owes at least equal debt to Johann Zöllner and a greater debt to Paul Rée and Schopenhauer; and that Nietzsche’s general presentation of Hartmann fails to credit him for any intellectual debts.⁵¹ Just as Hartmann positioned himself against what he perceived was a dangerous trend, so did Nietzsche attack Hartmann as a voice in the chorus of Hegelianism.

Nevertheless, because Nietzsche did not inveigh against him directly, adopting instead that curiously ironic presentation I have already outlined, there must be more to the story than straightforward aversion. I would suggest that his writing

represents three sources of positive influence for Nietzsche. First, Hartmann offered Nietzsche an alternative reading of Schopenhauer to that of his own, one that stresses in Schopenhauer the life-denying pessimism against which Nietzsche was growing ever more cautious. In HL, he represents Hartmann's interpretation as a *Spass-Philosophie*, but Nietzsche surely knew that his portrayal was always intended as an *Ernst-Philosophie*. Because Hartmann thought of himself as a good Schopenhauerian, and because Nietzsche already saw through the life-denying pessimism of Hartmann, Nietzsche's distrust of Hartmann may well have been one of the factors contributing to his break with Schopenhauer, which, it is traditionally thought, followed soon thereafter.⁵² To be sure, the *Bejahung* of his later philosophy was in large part a response to the pessimism of Schopenhauer. But I think it was also a response to Hartmann, against whose brand of pessimism he reacted first.

I would suggest, second, that Hartmann was valuable to Nietzsche as a source for the history of philosophy, especially the thought of Hegel, Kant, and Darwin. The *Lesespuren* to Nietzsche's copy of the 1879 *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* suggest that Nietzsche employed Hartmann's summary of various philosophers' positions and his critiques of them as a source along the way toward his own formulations. In this way, the many volumes of Hartmann's writings can be ranked alongside the works of Schopenhauer, Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (1866), and Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (1866) as among the most important source materials for Nietzsche's reading in the history of ideas.

The third debt that I see concerns the relation of philosophy to psychology, a relation that Hartmann historically helped to define. Nietzsche, the "old psychologist" himself (*TI P*), who would laud psychology as the "Queen of the Sciences" (*BGE* 23), employs a speculative psychology as a tool of criticism and as a sort of measuring stick in certain spheres more typically assigned to philosophy; the major precedent for such a tendency, whether Nietzsche would admit it, is indeed the work of Eduard Hartmann.⁵³ And although it is true that the tendency toward psychological analysis is one found even in Nietzsche's earlier works of philology, the full expression of the connection between history and the drives of historians was only expositied during the time in which Nietzsche was reading the works of Hartmann. So, though Nietzsche already sensed a connection between the unconscious drives of historians and their reconstructions of history, his reading of Hartmann, along with that of David Strauss and his association with Burckhardt, served, I believe, to channel this apprehension into the expression we find in HL. Moreover, the propensity to unite that speculative psychology, à la Shakespeare or Dostoevsky, with the physiognomic psychology of Letourneau or Mantegazza is prefigured by Hartmann's dual forays into both the speculative philosophies of Hegel and Schopenhauer and the physiological insights of Darwin and Fechner.⁵⁴ Although this specula-

tive form of psychology did not win popularity in the twentieth century, it is a form that Nietzsche and Hartmann in a general way share in contrast to the more popular forms of experimentalism today. In the end, though, Nietzsche warned us against claiming “that’s where he got it!” and it would be inappropriate to disregard that warning here. Nietzsche did not derive his psychology wholesale from Hartmann or anyone else. Yet Hartmann stands historically as a precedent for certain trends in Nietzsche’s thought, and I believe it necessary to understand these precedents as they represent frameworks in which and against which Nietzsche casts his own thought.

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NOTES

1. The most thorough research has been presented in Maurice Weyembergh, *Nietzsche et E. von Hartmann* (Brussels, 1977); Wolfert von Rahden, “Eduard von Hartmann ‘und’ Nietzsche: Zur Strategie der verzögerten Konterkritik Hartmanns an Nietzsche,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 13 (1984): 481–502; and Frederico Gerratana, “Der Wahn jenseits des Menschen: Zur frühen E.v. Hartmann-Rezeption Nietzsches (1869–1874),” *Nietzsche-Studien* 17 (1988): 391–433.

2. Among the works that at least mention a connection between Nietzsche and Hartmann are H. M. Wolff, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Der Weg zum Nichts* (Bern, 1956); Bernd Nitzschke, “Zur Herkunft des ‘Es’: Freud, Groddeck, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, und E. von Hartmann,” *Psyche: Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen* 37 (1983): 769–804; Jörg Salaquarda, “Studien zur 2. *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung*,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 13 (1984): 1–45, esp. 30 ff.; Claudia Crawford, *The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language* (Berlin, 1988); Wilhelm W. Hemecker, “Physiologie, Psychologie, oder Philosophie: Die Herkunft der Psychoanalyse,” in *Vor Freud: Philosophiegeschichtliche Voraussetzungen der Psychoanalyse* (Munich, 1991), 21–75; Robin Small, “Nietzsche, Dühring, and Time,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28, no. 2 (1990): 229–50; Curt Paul Janz, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Biographie*, vol. 1 (Munich, 1978), 562–64.

3. Of course, one should note that there were many nonpsychologists from whom Nietzsche extracted a number of psychological themes. Among the most important are the literary characters of Goethe, Schiller, Shakespeare, and Emerson; the character portraits of the French moralists Diderot, Montaigne, and La Rochefoucauld; and certainly the analyses of Schopenhauer. One cannot overlook, either, the importance of Dostoyevsky, of whom Nietzsche writes, “Dostoyevsky, the only psychologist, by the way, from whom I had anything to learn” (*TI* “Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen” 45). Nor should one overlook Stendhal, whom he labels “this last great psychologist” (*BGE* 39). Two other scientists working in psychology whom Nietzsche was reading at the time should also be mentioned, though I can here only name them: Johann Zöllner and Hermann Ludwig von Helmholtz. Additionally, it is now understood that Paul Rée was a critical figure in the formation of Nietzsche’s conception of psychology. Rée’s influence, however, came slightly later than the main treatment of Hartmann, from 1875 onward. For the interrelation between Nietzsche and Rée, see Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship* (Oxford, 2005).

4. At times, Nietzsche possessed and made considerable notation in Eduard von Hartmann’s *Ueber die dialektische Methode: Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen* (Berlin, 1868); *Philosophie des Unbewussten: Versuch einer Weltanschauung* (Berlin, 1869); *Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkt der Physiologie und Descendenztheorie: Eine kritische Beleuchtung des naturphilosophischen Theils der Philosophie des Unbewussten aus naturwissenschaftlichen*

Gesichtspunkten (Berlin, 1872); *Shakespeare's "Romeo und Julia"* (Leipzig, 1874); *Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus: Eine kritische Darstellung der organischen Entwicklungstheorie* (Leipzig, 1875); and *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins: Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Ethik* (Berlin, 1879). The only two of these that are still found in his private library, at the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek in Weimar, are the 1872 and 1879 volumes. Of these, the first is barely marked, but the second is heavily notated by Nietzsche. Thomas Brobjer has noted that there were in his library approximately forty books that are today classifiable as “psychology” or “physiology,” of which the most significant are H. Höffding, *Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung* (1887); and Paul Rée, *Psychologische Beobachtungen* (Berlin, 1875). See Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Ethics of Character: A Study of Nietzsche's Ethics and Its Place in the History of Moral Thinking* (Uppsala, 1995), 60 n. 28.

5. My own translation of this work loosely follows the standard English edition: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, 1997). I count more than fifty references to Hartmann in the KSA edition of Nietzsche's *Nachlass*. To his theories there are many more, though it is often not easy to determine whether a particular reference to the “Unconscious” is directly to Hartmann.

There are thirteen mentions of Hartmann in the KSB, and the letters in which they are found were addressed most commonly to Erwin Rohde and Carl von Gersdorff. The first mention of him is dated August 4, 1869. Here Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* is recommended to Gersdorff along with Wagner's *Deutsche Kunst und Politik* and *Oper und Drama*, as “ein wichtiges Buch für Dich . . . , trotz der Unredlichkeit des Verfassers” (KSB 3:36). In his response to a letter from Erwin Rohde in November of that year, a letter in which Rohde criticizes Hartmann for a bastardization of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche expresses in a way similar to that in HL his sarcastic attitude, about which I will say more in this essay. Nietzsche writes, “Still, I read a lot of him since he has the most beautiful knowledge,” and then: “He is an entirely fragile, self-abnegating [*contracter*] man—with something wicked here and there, it seems to me, even petty and at any rate ingratiating” (KSB 3:73). In May 1872, Nietzsche mentioned to Gersdorff that he would like to have Hartmann's correspondence address in order to send him a copy of his *Birth of Tragedy* (KSB 3:316).

6. Though HL is the most thorough presentation, Hartmann is mentioned sporadically in writings and correspondence that span from August 1869, when his book was recommended to Gersdorff, to September 1888, when Nietzsche criticizes him along Dühring (KSA 13:546).

7. Eduard von Hartmann, “Nietzsches ‘neue Moral,’” *Preussische Jahrbücher* 67 (1891): 504–21.

8. References to this work are from Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten: Speculative Resultate nach inductiv-naturwissenschaftlicher Methode*, 12th ed., vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1923). References to the 1869 edition are from Nietzsche's personal copy, found in the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek in Weimar. A publication history of *Philosophie des Unbewussten* can be found at Gerratana, “Der Wahn jenseits des Menschen,” 391 n. 1.

9. See Wilhelm Wundt, *Logik: Eine Untersuchung der Principien der Erkenntnis und der Methode wissenschaftlicher Forschung* (Stuttgart, 1880–83); *Ethik: Eine Untersuchung der Thatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens* (Stuttgart, 1886); and *System der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1889).

10. Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1869), 455.

11. Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1869), 523.

12. Hartmann writes, “What then is fate or providence [*Schicksal oder Vorsehung*] but the rule of the Unconscious, the historic instinct in the actions of mankind, as long as their conscious understanding is not mature enough to make the aims of history their own!” (*Philosophie des Unbewussten* [1923], 343).

13. Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1923), 334. He writes, “The progress of the spiritual possession of humanity goes hand in hand with the anthropological development of the race” (*Philosophie des Unbewussten* [1923], 331). At one point Hartmann even quips, “It may be said, therefore, that the theme of the present book is mainly the elevation of Hegel’s unconscious Philosophy of the Unconscious into a conscious one” (*Philosophie des Unbewussten* [1923], 24).

14. Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1923), 24–26.

15. Needless to say, this is a wide departure from Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As we shall see, such an attitude partly fueled Nietzsche’s invective against Hartmann.

16. See Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1923), 22–24. Hartmann quotes Schelling several times in this context throughout the corpus. For example, he writes: “To the Conscious, that is, that freely determining activity which we have before deduced, there shall be opposed an Unconscious one, whereby, in spite of the unlimited expression of freedom, something arises quite involuntarily, and perhaps even against the will of the actor, which he himself could never have realized by means of his own volition. This proposition, however paradoxical it may appear, is indeed nothing else but the transcendental expression of the generally accepted and presupposed relation of freedom to a concealed necessity which is called now fate, now providence, without anything being more clearly thought by the one or the other; that relation in virtue of which human beings, through their free action itself, and indeed against their will, are compelled to be the causes of something which they did not will, or conversely in virtue of which something must fail and go wrong, which they have willed with freedom and with the exertion of their energies” (*Philosophie des Unbewussten* [1923], 24–25).

17. Hartmann explains in two ways how the Unconscious impels the motion of history: first, as the mysterious impulse that causes the masses to migrate and make crusades and national revolutions (such, he believed, is accomplished without the Conscious knowledge of the individuals who carry out history’s aims); and second, by the production of great pioneers or visionaries, who seem to “just appear at the right time and place to solve epochal problems” (*Philosophie des Unbewussten* [1923], 329).

18. Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1923), 323.

19. Nietzsche quotes this phrase at HL 9.

20. Nietzsche is quoting from Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1869), 638. C. P. Janz claims that Hartmann was one of the models for Nietzsche’s characterization of the “Last Man” (*Friedrich Nietzsche*, 563).

21. Curt Paul Janz believes that *Schalk aller Schalke* was intended to mimic Rossini’s epitome for the Barber of Seville, “Barbier aller Barbieri” (*Friedrich Nietzsche*, 562). Janz also notes that Nietzsche uses a similar rhetorical structure against Wagner some years later: “Klingsor aller Klingsore.”

22. For another example, in the notes to his *Einleitung und Encyclopädie der klassischen Philologie*, Nietzsche attacks a newspaper article from 1871 in which Hartmann articulates his ideals of *Gymnasialreform*. The attack is preserved in Gerrata, “Der Wahn jenseits des Menschen,” 403. The notes date from Nietzsche’s summer semester at Basel in 1871. They are preserved in *Grossoktavausgabe*, 19 vols., ed. F. Koegel (Leipzig, 1895–97), 17:327–52. Hartmann’s article appeared July 1, 1871, in the *Berliner Nationalzeitung* under the title “Ueber die Gymnasialreform.”

23. Nietzsche would further deride Hartmann’s *Romeo and Juliet* in a letter to the German translator of Sophocles, Oswald Marback, on June 14, 1874 (*KSB* 4:234).

24. Nietzsche was surely being ironic in his notes of 1885: “I was at that time mistaken: I thought E.v. Hartmann was a finely-tuned mind and jester [*überlegener Kopf und Spaassvogel*], who made fun of the pessimistic confusion of the time; I found his discovery on the ‘Unconscious’ so sardonic, so comical, that it appeared to me a real mousetrap for the mopes and imbeciles of philosophical dilettantism, as he spreads ever more throughout Germany” (*KSA* 11:532–33). Weyembergh manipulates this quotation (see *Nietzsche et E. von Hartmann*, 23).

25. Pliny the Younger, Epistles III, 16. Nietzsche owned the complete German edition of Pliny's works: Plinius Caecilius Secundus der Jüngere, *Werke*, 5 vols., trans. C. F. A. Schott (Stuttgart, 1827–38).

26. Nietzsche's parody continues for several very entertaining lines: "Paete, siehe mich an: bin ich nicht freundlich blau, ja sogar preussisch blau; Paete, in der That, ich lasse gar nichts zu wünschen übrig. Paete, non dolet! Paete, dieser Pessimismus thut nicht weh! Paete, deine Arria beisst nicht! Paete: Eduard is voller Rücksicht, behaglich, human, freundlich, sogar reichsfreundlich, sogar preussisch-blau, kurz Eduard is ein Mädchen für Alles und sein Pessimismus lässt gar nichts zu wünschen übrig" (*KSA* 11:532–33).

27. The mark can be seen in Nietzsche's personal library: Signatur C 269, the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek, Weimar.

28. See Gerratana, "Der Wahn jenseits des Menschen," 393.

29. This claim must remain speculative for two reasons. First, it cannot be known exactly when Nietzsche wrote Hartmann's name on the title page. If it were after the 1877 announcement by Hartmann, then this all amounts to very little. Second, Nietzsche nowhere records in writing his suspicion that the anonymous work is Hartmann's, though this absence does not prove the contrary to my own supposition. However, Nietzsche's repeated declamation of Hartmann as a "parodist" would suggest at least the probability that he had discovered Hartmann's ruse before the public revelation. In other words, had Nietzsche written Hartmann's name in the anonymous book only after 1877, which would indicate that only at that time did Nietzsche realize the parody, then we would have to accept that in 1875's HL Nietzsche had with no cause labeled him a parodist and only by great coincidence is vindicated by Hartmann's admission two years thereafter. It is much more probable that Nietzsche first recognized the parody himself, jotted down the name in the anonymous book, and then described Hartmann as a parodist in HL.

30. To be precise, the Nietzsche quotation reads, "[T]he cynical canon: as things are they had to be, as men now are they were bound to become, none may resist this inevitability." In all, this is the explanation of Salaquarda ("Studien zur 2. *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung*," 41). Salaquarda, I believe, is correct in attributing the cynicism-turned-irony Nietzsche discusses in HL to Hartmann. This goes some way in explaining the irony of Nietzsche's own presentation. Salaquarda's conclusion, that Nietzsche's irony is reducible to an illustration of the cynicism of historical sense, however, is too strong. My own position is that there were several factors motivating Nietzsche's invectives, which I will continue to explain in this section.

31. H. M. Wolff (*Friedrich Nietzsche*), believes that much of the influence of Hartmann is expressed in the overt "Unconscious" colorings of the Dionysian impulse discussed in *BT* and also that the influence of Hartmann was important in Nietzsche overcoming Schopenhauer. For a criticism, see Gerratana, "Der Wahn jenseits des Menschen," 398 ff. Claudia Crawford (*The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*) is especially concerned to represent the influence of Hartmann on Nietzsche's early theories of knowledge and language. Although Crawford does an admirable job explicating Hartmann's theories and their importance for the young Nietzsche, she does not, in my opinion, pay sufficient attention to the changing and purposefully obfuscated attitude of Nietzsche toward Hartmann.

32. The statement is part of a letter to Nietzsche from Cosima Wagner dated January 27, 1870. The full indictment reads, "Mr. von Hartmann appears to me to belong to this new group; I'm entirely unauthorized to supply a judgment here, but it seems to me that what he stole from Schopenhauer was good, and whatever is his own is bad. And it seems to me a bit naïve to claim that Schopenhauer knew nothing about unconscious representation, since his entire system as such ([notions] like Time and Space) is based on it." An earlier letter to Erwin Rohde on November 5, 1869, reveals the same theme (*KGB* II/2:74). In 1875, Nietzsche returns to this attitude: "The impenetrability [*Dummheit*] of the Will is the greatest debt owed to Schopenhauer, if one judges debts according to their strength. One can in Hartmann see how he immediately conjures away

[*eskamotirt*] this debt. Something impenetrable [*Dummes*] will no one name God” (KSA 8:46). Other notes from 1882–85 reference an assimilation of Schopenhauer’s pessimism with the “pessimism of sensibility” represented by Hartmann. Nietzsche mentions this wrong-minded association in print at *TI* “Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen” 16: “There are yet worse ‘and’s’; I have with my own ears—at least only among the university professors—heard, “Schopenhauer ‘and’ Von Hartmann.” This attitude, I believe, comes as a response to the publication of Eduard von Hartmann’s *Zur Geschichte und Begründung des Pessimismus* (Leipzig, 1880), which further portrays Schopenhauer as a forerunner of Hartmann’s own moral psychology.

33. Heinrich Romundt had first recommended Hartmann to Nietzsche by means of a letter sent May 4, 1869, in terms of the very same connection between Hartmann and Schopenhauer. Romundt’s position in that letter is very much consistent with what would become Nietzsche’s own interpretation: that Hartmann was heavily relying on Schopenhauer, that he did not properly credit Schopenhauer for what he borrowed, and that he badly misrepresented Schopenhauer’s intentions. As an indicative statement of his attitude, which would have struck an unfortunate chord with Nietzsche’s own prejudices, Romundt writes, “Jedenfalls wird allerdings das Buch beitragen, Schopenhauersche Geistesstaat unter den Juden zu verbreiten” (*KGB* II/2:10).

34. As for these attitudes, which strike discordant notes against Hegel, Nietzsche writes: “Overproud Europeans of the Nineteenth century, you are raving! Your knowledge does not perfect nature—it only destroys your own nature! Compare for once the heights of your capacity for knowledge with the depths of your incapacity for action. It is true you climb upon the sunbeams of knowledge up to heaven itself, but you also climb down into chaos. Your manner of moving, that of climbing upon knowledge is your fatality; the ground sinks away from you into the unknown; there is no longer any support for your life, only spider’s threads which every new grasp of knowledge tears apart. But enough of this seriousness, since it is also possible to view the matter more cheerfully” (HL 9).

35. A later statement of Nietzsche’s mirrors this attitude: “I hate this pessimism of sensibility. It itself is a sign of an impoverishment of life. I would not even allow such an emaciated monkey as von Hartmann to speak about ‘philosophical pessimism’” (KSA 13:30).

36. Throughout his study, Weyembergh contrasts Hartmann’s vision of history to Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence. Weyembergh is surely correct that the Eternal Recurrence is almost diametrically opposed to the Hegelian notions of time and history, which Hartmann puts to his own uses. But by Nietzsche’s own admission, he had not yet envisioned the Eternal Recurrence, and thereby its connection to a theory of history, until the time of *Zarathustra*. Therefore, it is wrong to believe that Nietzsche could have opposed Hartmann’s pessimistic vision of historical progress with his own Eternal Recurrence at the time of HL. See Weyembergh, *Nietzsche et E. von Hartmann*, 31–74, 106–61.

37. I offer one more text in support of this conclusion: “Should one wish to express simply what Hartmann proclaims to us from the smoky tripod of unconscious irony, so would he say: he tells us that it would be quite sufficient for our time to be exactly as it is, to bring about, eventually, a condition in which people would find this existence intolerable: which we truly believe. This dreadful ossification of our age [*erschreckende Verknöcherung der Zeit*], this restless rattling of the bones . . . is justified by Hartmann, not only from behind, *ex causis efficientibus*, but even from in front, *ex causa finali*; the rogue [*Schalk*] illuminates our age with the light of the Last Day, and it turns out that our age is a very fine one, especially for him who wants to suffer as acutely as possible from the indigestibility of life and for whom therefore that Last Day cannot come quickly enough. It is true that Hartmann calls the time of life mankind is now approaching its ‘manhood’: but by this description he means the happy condition in which all that remains is ‘solid mediocrity.’ . . . Rogue of rogues [*Schalk aller Schalke*], you give voice to the longings of contemporary mankind: but you likewise know the specter that will stand at the end of these years of manhood as an outcome of that intellectual training in solid mediocrity—disgust [*Ekel*]. Things

are already in a visibly sorry state, but they will get very much sorer, 'the Antichrist is visibly extending his influence wider and wider'—but that is how it *must* be, that is what it *must* come to, for the road we have taken can lead only to disgust with all existence" (HL 9).

38. See *BGE* 204; *KSA* 11:252, 492.

39. There is one early mention of Nietzsche in a footnote in Eduard von Hartmann, *Die Selbstersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft* (Leipzig, 1874), 82. However, this is not a comprehensive response.

40. Hartmann, "Nietzsches 'neue Moral.'"

41. Eduard von Hartmann, "Nietzsche's 'neue Moral,'" in *Ethische Studien* (Leipzig, 1898), 34–69. Additional articles that mention Nietzsche are Eduard von Hartmann, "Der Anarchismus," *Die Gegenwart* 1 (1897): 2–4; and "Der Individualismus der Gegenwart," *Preussische Jahrbücher* 96 (1899): 30–56.

42. Brief commentaries on the critical publications can be found in Weyembergh, *Nietzsche et E. von Hartmann*, 162–86; Salaquarda, "Studien zur 2. *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung*," esp. 30–35; and Rahden, "Eduard von Hartmann 'und' Nietzsche," 481–502.

43. Hartmann locates the cause for this mistake in Nietzsche's so-called effeminate inclination to view Schopenhauer in the light of the "French sensualist psychologists" ("Nietzsches 'neue Moral,'" 507). For "brother geniuses," see Hartmann, "Nietzsches 'neue Moral,'" 508.

44. Hartmann, "Nietzsches 'neue Moral,'" 515.

45. Hartmann, "Nietzsches 'neue Moral,'" 509. Cf. Weyembergh, *Nietzsche et E. von Hartmann*, 174.

46. Cf. Rahden, "Eduard von Hartmann 'und' Nietzsche," 488. It is also of note that Hartmann believed Stirner's position on the absolutism of the "I" to be an effect of the subjective monism of Fichte. As another criticism, Hartmann claims Nietzsche is doing a *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* even though he did not bother to read Hartmann's own book of that title. This attack we know to be false, because Nietzsche did own that book and marked it intensively. It is surely not the case that Nietzsche saw himself as conducting any such *Phänomenologie* in his writings.

47. Hartmann writes, "The author Nietzsche is quite obviously effeminate [*weibisch*] in his sharply outspoken subjectivity, which hates all objectivity, in his lack of justification and the paucity of his judgment, in his aversion for truth" ("Nietzsche's 'neue Moral,'" 65–66).

48. Hartmann, "Nietzsche's 'neue Moral,'" 65, 63.

49. Ironically, the earliest book Nietzsche read that gives any serious treatment of Stirner (Lange's 1866 *Geschichte des Materialismus* makes only a passing reference to Stirner) was in fact Hartmann's 1869 *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (see, e.g., 611–14). Of course, were it the case that Nietzsche obtained whatever little information about Stirner he had from Hartmann, then the charge of plagiarism would be ironic indeed. Furthermore, Nietzsche did not own *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* and did not borrow it from the Basel library, contra Salaquarda, "Studien zur 2. *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung*," 31 n. 64. This, however, cannot prove that Nietzsche did not read it. Salaquarda's own position is that the differences between Stirner and Nietzsche are much greater than the commonalities, and this is a position with which I would agree. For a thorough discussion, see John Glassford, "Did Friedrich Nietzsche Plagiarize Max Stirner?" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 18 (1999): 73–79. Glassford's thesis is that although Nietzsche did not plagiarize, he may well have read Stirner. For a response, see Thomas H. Brobjer, "A Possible Solution to the Stirner–Nietzsche Question," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 25 (2003): 109–14. See also Weyembergh, *Nietzsche et E. von Hartmann*, 162–65.

Rahden ("Eduard von Hartmann 'und' Nietzsche") offers a highly detailed analysis of Hartmann's second pamphlet, concluding that as a critique of Nietzsche's work it is rather ineffective. He further suggests that the differences between the first and second pamphlets center on Hartmann's motivations: whereas in the first he does wish to critique Nietzschean philosophy,

the second is more a *politische Kampfschrift* against the Hegelian Left, in whose camp he placed Nietzsche's ethics.

50. Such, too, is the argument in Salaquarda, "Studien zur 2. *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung*," 33.

51. Salaquarda makes both points ("Studien zur 2. *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung*," 32). I would object to Salaquarda, though, that in 1862 Nietzsche had nothing like the theory of drives operative in HL and certainly not the depth of the psychological portraits found in his later writings.

52. On December 19, 1876, Nietzsche wrote to Cosima Wagner, "Would you be surprised if I confess to you something that has come on slowly, but which has rather suddenly entered my consciousness: a widening split with Schopenhauer's teaching? On almost every proposition I'm against him" (*KSB* 5:210).

53. Indeed, it is unlikely that Nietzsche would admit it. Take, for instance, *EH* "warum ich ein Schicksal bin" 7: "Who before me at all among philosophers has been a psychologist and not rather its opposite, 'higher swindler,' 'idealist'? Before me there was no psychology."

54. Phillip Letourneau, *Physiologie des passions* (Paris, 1868); Paul Mantegazza, *Die Physiologie der Liebe*, trans. Eduard Engel (Jena, 1877); Paul Mantegazza, *Physiologie des Genusses* (Leipzig, 1881). All of these works were in Nietzsche's personal library, along with several other books related to the field of physiology. See Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Ethics of Character*, 60–61 n. 28.

It must also be mentioned that Nietzsche did take up certain Hartmannian themes in his early theories of knowledge and language. However, I cannot add to this discussion anything more than what Claudia Crawford (*The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*) has already written.